imtoken官方版下载app|identity
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2024-03-09 20:55:12
identity - 搜索 词典
tity - 搜索 词典 Rewards网页图片视频学术词典地图更多航班我的必应笔记本identity美 [aɪˈdentəti] 英 [aɪˈdentɪti] n.身份；同一性；一致；特征网络认同；身分；识别复数：identities 搭配同义词adj.+n.national identity,true identity,corporate identity,secret identity,real identityv.+n.establish identity,prove identity,discover identity,reveal identity,lose identityn.individuality,uniqueness,distinctiveness,self,character权威英汉双解英汉英英网络释义identity显示所有例句n.1.[c][u]身份；本身；本体who or what sb/sth isThe police are trying to discover the identity of the killer.警方正努力调查杀人凶手的身份。Their identities were kept secret.他们的身份保密。She is innocent; it was a case of mistaken identity .她是无辜的；那是身份判断错误。Do you have any proof of identity?你有身份证明吗？The thief used a false identity.窃贼使用的是假身份。She went through an identity crisis in her teens(= was not sure of who she was or of her place in society) .她在十多岁时经历了一次身份危机。2.[c][u]特征；特有的感觉（或信仰）the characteristics, feelings or beliefs that distinguish people from othersa sense of national/cultural/personal/group identity民族╱文化╱个人╱群体特性的认同感a plan to strengthen the corporate identity of the company加强公司的企业形象的计划3.[u]~ (with sb/sth).~ (between A and B)同一性；相同；一致the state or feeling of being very similar to and able to understand sb/sthan identity of interests利益一致There's a close identity between fans and their team.球迷和他们的球队之间有密切的同一性。n.1.同一,一致;同一性2.【逻】同一性3.本体;正身;个性4.【数】恒等(式)1.同一,一致;同一性2.【逻】同一性3.本体;正身;个性4.【数】恒等(式)n.1.who you are, or what your name is; the qualities that make someone or something what they are and different from other people2.the fact of being exactly the same1.身份从身份 ( identity)一词可以看出 ,它是“ 被区别出来的 ③ 特性 ” ,而要区别一个民族和其他民族的特性 ,除了进行 ( 民族历史“ 筛选 …wenku.baidu.com|基于4746个网页2.认同...同危机( crisis of identity)与认同(identity)问题一样,都是当前学术界讨论的热点问题,它们的热度在于两者与个人生活及社会生活...wuxizazhi.cnki.net|基于2154个网页3.同一性同一性（Identity）：指个体对自身及自己的生活目标的意识。它是在人生第五发展阶段（12——20岁）的危机得到积极的解决 …zhidao.baidu.com|基于1912个网页4.身分主要的身分(identity)无法复制。精确的复制永远是知识不足造成的结果。blog.sina.com.cn|基于1904个网页5.识别识别最上层应用程式的识别 (Identity)，包括其相依性。由 ClickOnce 在内部使用以管理应用程式储存和启动。msdn.microsoft.com|基于1113个网页6.身份认同身份认同 (Identity)是西方文化研究的一个重要概念，它受到新左派、女权主义、后殖民主义的特别青睐。其基本含义，是指个 …baike.baidu.com|基于1082个网页7.一致3d max 中英文对照 - 小M的日志 - 网易博客 ... Icosa 二十面体；余弦拟合 Identity 一致 IES Sky IES 天光 ... mirageqq.blog.163.com|基于832个网页8.标识 （1）在【标识（Identity）】选项卡中选中“交互式用户（The interactive user）”. （2）在【安全（Security）】选项卡中，分别 …www.jb51.net|基于562个网页更多释义收起释义例句释义:全部全部,身份身份,同一性同一性,一致一致,特征特征,认同认同,身分身分,识别识别类别:全部全部,口语口语,书面语书面语,标题标题,技术技术来源:全部全部,字典字典,网络网络难度:全部全部,简单简单,中等中等,难难更多例句筛选收起例句筛选1.As for the identity of the 75 guests, Prince Robert kept it a secret to the last.至于75位来宾的身份，罗伯特王子则保密至最后一刻。chinese.wsj.com2.Once my journalistic identity was known, however, the police arrived and made a show of locking one of the doors.不过，就在我的记者身份暴露之时，警方到达并锁上了大厅其中的一扇门。www.bing.com3.In this exercise, your goal is to begin to explore the roots of your own identity or the identity of someone you know well.在这项练习当中，你们的目标是要探索你们自己或是某位你相当熟悉的人士身份认同的根本。www.myoops.org4.He used his special identity of FBI to ask one trainman to leave one compartment for them.他利用自己是联邦特工的特殊身份，让一名列车员给他们腾出来一间车厢。www.1363.cn5.Now claims seem to be a central part of the identity model in . NET.现在声明看上去成了.NET身份验证模型中的核心部分。www.infoq.com6.Woodland students are no doubt very good, we have to treasure even more the identity of the identity of this proud, proud!翠园的学生，无疑都是很出色的，我们要更加珍惜这个身份，为这个身份而骄傲，自豪！wenwen.soso.com7.Language is often viewed as an important symbol of identity. This case is easily found on new female immigrants.语言常被看作是一种标记认同的重要符码，此现象在新移民女性身上尤其明显。120.114.52.2128.the female , with no identity document found on her , might have fallen from height but the jumping point is yet to be ascertained.死者身上并没有身份证明文件。她可能由高处堕下，但现时仍未确定她堕楼的位置。www.ichacha.net9.The identity is only used to identify peers locally - it has no global significance.身份只用于对对等机进行本地识别它没有全局意义。www-128.ibm.com10."For many, land is at the heart of a nation's identity, and it is especially easy to raise emotions about outsiders when land is involved. "她在近期文章中写道：“对于许多人来说，土地是国家身份的核心问题，当涉及到土地问题时，局外人很容易变得情绪高涨。”www.bing.com12345© 2024 Microsoft隐私声明和 Cookie法律声明广告帮IDENTITY中文(简体)翻译：剑桥词典
IDENTITY中文(简体)翻译：剑桥词典
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identity 在英语-中文（简体）词典中的翻译
identitynoun [ C or U ] uk
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/aɪˈden.tə.ti/ us
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/aɪˈden.t̬ə.t̬i/
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B2 who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others
身份；本身；特性
The man's identity was being kept secret while he was helping police with enquiries.
这个男子在协助警方调查时，他的身份是保密的。
I cannot reveal the identity of my source.
我不能透露我的消息来源。
The informant was given a new identity (= a different name and new official documents) for protection.
给了线人一个新身份以作保护。
The newspaper photo apparently showed him in Rome but it was a case of mistaken identity (= it was the wrong person).
报纸上的照片似乎显示他在罗马，但其实那个人不是他。
In prison people often suffer from a loss of identity.
在狱中人们经常会失去自我。
I think my job gives me a sense of identity.
我觉得我的工作给了我一种认同感。
更多范例减少例句He was quite certain about his attacker's identity.He assumed a false identity in order to escape from the police.To conceal his identity, the man's words are being read by an actor.Through a process of deduction , the detectives discovered the identity of the killer.Australia has its own cultural identity, which is very different from that of Britain.
(identity在剑桥英语-中文（简体）词典的翻译 © Cambridge University Press)
identity的例句
identity
Coherence can be partially ensured if different semantic identities are based on similar structural characteristics.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
The identity of these factors is unlikely to be discerned from demographic records and presumably reflects the influence of social changes.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Internally caudillo warfare had set back any hopes of a truly national identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Some returned to join another garden on a false identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
The internet has thus functioned for the burgeoning movement as an anchor and definer of identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
It turns out that they are not; we can take the conversion to be a syntactic identity, and thus expel the bindings from call-by-need.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Identity is certainly a tricky issue; one that appears to mean different things to different people.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
The paper examines the contribution that gender roles and identities make to the overall configuration of resources available to particular individuals.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
示例中的观点不代表剑桥词典编辑、剑桥大学出版社和其许可证颁发者的观点。
B2
identity的翻译
中文（繁体）
身份, 本身, 特性…
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identidad, identidad [feminine]…
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identidade, identidade [feminine]…
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身元, 独自性, 固有性…
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kimlik, hüviyet, belirleyici/tanımlayıcı özellik…
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identité [feminine], identité…
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identitat…
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ஒரு நபர் யார், அல்லது ஒரு நபர் அல்லது குழுவின் குணங்கள் மற்றவர்களிடமிருந்து வேறுபடுகின்றன…
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identitet…
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identitet…
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identiti…
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die Identität…
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identitet [masculine], identitet…
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شناخت, نام و نشان (کسی شخص یا گروپ کی خصوصیات کی نشاندہی کرنا، ظاہر کرنا)…
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особа…
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личность, отличительные черты, индивидуальность…
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ఒక వ్యక్తి ఎవరనేది, లేదా ఒక వ్యక్తి లేక సమూహాన్ని ఇతరులనుంచి వేరుచేసే లక్షణాలు…
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هُويّة…
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totožnost…
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identitas…
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รูปพรรณสัณฐาน…
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nhân dạng…
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tożsamość…
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신원, 정체성…
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identità…
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identify with someone
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identity更多的中文(简体)翻译
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brand identity
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identity是什么意思_identity的翻译_音标_读音_用法_例句_爱词霸在线词典
tity是什么意思_identity的翻译_音标_读音_用法_例句_爱词霸在线词典首页翻译背单词写作校对词霸下载用户反馈专栏平台登录identity是什么意思_identity用英语怎么说_identity的翻译_identity翻译成_identity的中文意思_identity怎么读,identity的读音,identity的用法,identity的例句翻译人工翻译试试人工翻译翻译全文简明柯林斯牛津identity高中/CET4/CET6/考研/TOEFL/IELTS英 [aɪˈdentəti]美 [aɪˈdentəti]释义常用高考讲解n.身份; 个性; 一致大小写变形:Identity点击 人工翻译，了解更多 人工释义词态变化复数: identities;实用场景例句全部身份同一性个性恒等There's a close identity between fans and their team.球迷和他们的球队之间有密切的同一性。牛津词典an identity of interests利益一致牛津词典a plan to strengthen the corporate identity of the company加强公司的企业形象的计划牛津词典a sense of national/cultural/personal/group identity民族 / 文化 / 个人 / 群体特性的认同感牛津词典She went through an identity crisis in her teens (= was not sure of who she was or of her place in society) .她在十多岁时经历了一次自我认同的危机。牛津词典The thief used a false identity.窃贼使用的是假身份。牛津词典Do you have any proof of identity?你有身份证明吗？牛津词典She is innocent; it was a case of mistaken identity .她是无辜的；那是身份判断错误。牛津词典Their identities were kept secret.他们的身份保密。牛津词典The police are trying to discover the identity of the killer.警方正努力调查杀人凶手的身份。牛津词典...the distinct cultural, religious and national identity of many Italians.许多意大利人独有的文化、宗教、民族特性柯林斯高阶英语词典I wanted a sense of my own identity.我想要确立自己的个性意识。柯林斯高阶英语词典The police soon established his true identity and he was quickly found.警方不久就查出了他的真实身份，并很快找到了他。柯林斯高阶英语词典Abu is not his real name, but it's one he uses to disguise his identity...阿布不是他的真名，是他用于伪装身份的名字。柯林斯高阶英语词典The journalist did not want to reveal the identity of his informant.那个新闻工作者不想透露消息提供人的身份.《简明英汉词典》He had to conceal his identity to escape the police.为了躲避警方,他只好隐瞒身份.《简明英汉词典》They all seem to take an inflated view of their collective identity.他们对自己的集体身份似乎都持有一种夸大的看法.《简明英汉词典》She was fooled by his bogus identity card.她被他的假身份证骗了.《简明英汉词典》Passports are frequently serviceable in proving the identity of the traveller.护照往往可用来证明旅行者的身份.《现代汉英综合大词典》He showed his identity card and went in.他把工作证亮了一下就进去了.《现代汉英综合大词典》He was discovered living under an assumed identity in South America.他被发现以伪造的身分居住在南美洲.《简明英汉词典》When braced, Jack naturally denied his identity.当遇到拦路查问时, 杰克自然地否认了他的身分.《现代英汉综合大词典》Keep calm. Don't betray your identity.沉住气, 别可露馅儿.《现代汉英综合大词典》He never revealed his identity.他从未暴露过自己的身份.《简明英汉词典》The police think the videotape may hold some vital clues to the identity of the killer.警方认为那盘录像带可能录有能确认凶手身份的一些重要线索。《牛津高阶英汉双解词典》Memory is constitutive of identity.记忆是身份的一个重要构成部分。《牛津高阶英汉双解词典》The police are trying to discover the identity of the killer.警方正努力调查杀人凶手的身份。《牛津高阶英汉双解词典》He was shot in what seems to have been a case of mistaken identity .他像是被人认错了而遭到枪击的。《牛津高阶英汉双解词典》The identity cards are examined by an electronic scanner.用电子扫描器来检验身份证。《牛津高阶英汉双解词典》The president alone betokened the national identity.总统本身代表着一个国家的形象。柯林斯例句收起实用场景例句真题例句全部四级六级高考考研Your identity has been formed; you've built up your resources; and now you have the chance to take the big risks precisely because your foundation is already secure.出自-2017年6月阅读原文Goel didn't inform them about jill's true identity until April 26.2019年12月四级真题（第二套）阅读 Section CThe most successful environmental strategy will marry the green message to our own sense of identity.出自-2015年12月阅读原文I said, 'You could write about your identity issues.出自-2013年12月阅读原文He said, 'I don't have any identity issues出自-2013年12月阅读原文The two women has made a mistake in identity.出自-2012年6月听力原文He meant that we gain personal identity as we communicate with others.出自-2010年6月听力原文The profound connection between identity and communication is dramatically evident in children who are deprived of human contact出自-2010年6月听力原文Communications with others not only affects our sense of identity but also directly influences our physical and emotional well-being.出自-2010年6月听力原文As you acquire a distinctive identity, your attitudes are further refined by the behavior of those with whom you identify—your family, those of your gender and culture, and the people you admire, even though you may not know them personally.2019年12月六级真题（第二套）阅读 Section Csimilarly, Alison Jamison of New York decided with her husband that their child had a right to their own online identity.2018年12月六级真题（第三套）阅读 Section BThey include photos repurposed for inappropriate or illegal means, identity theft, embarrassment, bullying by peers or digital kidnapping.2018年12月六级真题（第三套）阅读 Section BAs data and identity theft becomes more and more common, the market is growing for biometric technologies to keep others out of private e-spaces.2019年高考英语全国卷I 阅读理解 阅读C 原文As their world expanded, she said, children compared themselves to others online in a way that was "hugely damaging in terms of their self-identity, in terms of their confidence, but also in terms of their ability to develop themselves".2018年高考英语江苏卷 阅读理解 阅读D 原文Children's comparing themselves to others online may lead to lower self-identity and confidence.2018年高考英语江苏卷 阅读理解 阅读D 原文He gave himself a new name to hide his identity when he went to carry out the secret task.2015年高考英语湖北卷 单项选择 原文If students rely on administrators to regulate their social behavior and thinking pattern, they are not facing the challenge of finding an identity within a larger and complex community.2016年高考英语北京卷 阅读理解 阅读D 原文It was assumed that those people for whom the role of volunteer was most part of their personal identity would also be most likely to continue volunteer work.2015年高考英语江苏卷 阅读理解 阅读C 原文Items like T-shirts that allow volunteers to be recognized publicly for their contributions can help strengthen role identity.2015年高考英语江苏卷 阅读理解 阅读C 原文The college years are supposed to be a time for important growth in autonomy and the development of adult identity.2016年高考英语北京卷 阅读理解 阅读D 原文These results, once again, lead to concrete advice: "once an individual begins volunteering, continued efforts might focus on developing a volunteer role identity.2015年高考英语江苏卷 阅读理解 阅读C 原文Thus, the keyboard can determine people's identities, and by extension, whether they should be given access to the computer it's connected to—regardless of whether someone gets the password right.2019年高考英语全国卷I 阅读理解 阅读C 原文It is not that pink intrinsically bad, but it is such a tiny slice of the rainbow and, though it may celebrate girlhood in one way, it also repeatedly and firmly fuses girls' identity to appearance.2012年考研真题（英语二）阅读理解 Section ⅡLast month, Howard Schmidt, the nation's cyber-czar, offered the federal government a proposal to make the Web a safer place—a "voluntary trusted identity" system that would be the high-tech equivalent of a physical key, a fingerprint and a photo ID card,2011年考研真题（英语二）完形填空 Section ⅠThe idea is to create a federation of private online identity systems.2011年考研真题（英语二）完形填空 Section ⅠThe system might use a smart identity card, or a digital credential linked to a specific computer, and would authenticate users at a range of online services.2011年考研真题（英语二）完形填空 Section Ⅰ收起真题例句英英释义Noun1. the distinct personality of an individual regarded as a persisting entity;"you can lose your identity when you join the army"2. the individual characteristics by which a thing or person is recognized or known;"geneticists only recently discovered the identity of the gene that causes it""it was too dark to determine his identity""she guessed the identity of his lover"3. an operator that leaves unchanged the element on which it operates;"the identity under numerical multiplication is 1"4. exact sameness;"they shared an identity of interests"收起英英释义同义词personalitynature行业词典医学个性：自己或他人认为代表此人的特征的总体 建筑识别性 心理学认同 数学恒等［式］ 法律鉴别 同一性 释义词态变化实用场景例句真题例句英英释义同义词行ASP.NET Core 上的 Identity 简介 | Microsoft Learn
ASP.NET Core 上的 Identity 简介 | Microsoft Learn
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ASP.NET Core 上的 Identity 简介
项目
11/30/2023
32 个参与者
反馈
本文内容
作者：Rick Anderson
ASP.NET Core Identity：
一个 API，它支持用户界面 (UI) 登录功能。
管理用户、密码、配置文件数据、角色、声明、令牌、电子邮件确认等等。
用户可使用存储在 Identity 中的登录信息创建帐户，或者可使用外部登录提供程序。 支持的外部登录提供程序包括 Facebook、Google、Microsoft 帐户和 Twitter。
有关如何全局要求所有用户进行身份验证的信息，请参阅需要通过身份验证的用户。
GitHub 上提供了 Identity 源代码。 Scaffold Identity 和查看生成的文件，以查看与 Identity 的模板交互。
Identity 通常使用 SQL Server 数据库进行配置，以存储用户名、密码和配置文件数据。 或者，可使用其他持久性存储，例如 Azure 表存储。
在本主题中，你将学习如何使用 Identity 来注册、登录和注销用户。 注意：模板会将用户的用户名和电子邮件看做是相同的。 若要更详细了解如何创建使用 Identity 的应用，请参阅后续步骤。
ASP.NET Core Identity 与 Microsoft 标识平台无关。 Microsoft 标识平台是：
Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) 开发人员平台的演变。
用于在 ASP.NET Core 应用中进行身份验证和授权的备用标识解决方案。
ASP.NET Core Identity 将用户界面 (UI) 登录功能添加到 ASP.NET Core Web 应用。 若要保护 Web API 和 SPA，请使用以下项之一：
Microsoft Entra ID
Azure Active Directory B2C (Azure AD B2C)
Duende Identity Server
Duende Identity Server 是适用于 ASP.NET Core 的 OpenID Connect 和 OAuth 2.0 框架。 Duende Identity Server 支持以下安全功能：
身份验证即服务 (AaaS)
跨多个应用程序类型的单一登录/注销 (SSO)
API 的访问控制
Federation Gateway
重要事项
Duende Software 可能会要求你为 Duende Identity Server 的生产使用支付许可证费用。 有关详细信息，请参阅从 ASP.NET Core 5.0 迁移到 6.0。
有关详细信息，请参阅 Duende Identity Server 文档（Duende Software 网站）。
查看或下载示例代码（下载方法）。
创建使用身份验证的 Web 应用
使用个人用户帐户创建“ASP.NET Core Web 应用程序”项目。
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
选择“ASP.NET Core Web 应用”模板。 将项目命名为 WebApp1，使其命名空间与项目下载项相同。 单击“确定”。
在“身份验证类型”输入中，选择“个人用户帐户”。
dotnet new webapp --auth Individual -o WebApp1
上述命令使用 SQLite 创建 Razor Web 应用。 若要使用 LocalDB 创建 Web 应用，请运行以下命令：
dotnet new webapp --auth Individual -uld -o WebApp1
生成的项目将 ASP.NET Core Identity 作为 Razor 类库提供。 IdentityRazor 类库公开具有 Identity 区域的终结点。 例如：
/Identity/Account/Login
/Identity/Account/Logout
/Identity/Account/Manage
应用迁移
应用迁移以初始化数据库。
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
在包管理器控制台 (PMC) 中运行以下命令：
Update-Database
使用 SQLite 时，此步骤不需要迁移。
如果尚未安装 dotnet ef，请安装它作为全局工具：
dotnet tool install --global dotnet-ef
有关 EF Core 的 CLI 的详细信息，请参阅 .NET CLI 的 EF Core 工具引用。
注意
默认情况下，要安装的 .NET 二进制文件的体系结构表示当前运行的 OS 体系结构。 若要指定不同的 OS 体系结构，请参阅 dotnet tool install, --arch option。
有关详细信息，请参阅 GitHub 问题 dotnet/AspNetCore.Docs #29262。
对于 LocalDB，请运行以下命令：
dotnet ef database update
测试注册和登录
运行应用并注册用户。 根据屏幕大小，你可能需要选择导航切换按钮来查看“注册”和“登录”链接。
查看 Identity 数据库
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
在“视图”菜单中选择“SQL Server 对象资源管理器”(SSOX)。
导航到“(localdb)MSSQLLocalDB(SQL Server 13)”。 右键单击“dbo.AspNetUsers”>“查看数据”：
可下载许多第三方工具来管理和查看 SQLite 数据库，例如 SQLite 的数据库浏览器。
配置 Identity 服务
这些服务添加在 Program.cs 中。 典型模式是按以下顺序调用方法：
Add{Service}
builder.Services.Configure{Service}
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
using Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore;
using WebApp1.Data;
var builder = WebApplication.CreateBuilder(args);
var connectionString = builder.Configuration.GetConnectionString("DefaultConnection");
builder.Services.AddDbContext
options.UseSqlServer(connectionString));
builder.Services.AddDatabaseDeveloperPageExceptionFilter();
builder.Services.AddDefaultIdentity
.AddEntityFrameworkStores
builder.Services.AddRazorPages();
builder.Services.Configure
{
// Password settings.
options.Password.RequireDigit = true;
options.Password.RequireLowercase = true;
options.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = true;
options.Password.RequireUppercase = true;
options.Password.RequiredLength = 6;
options.Password.RequiredUniqueChars = 1;
// Lockout settings.
options.Lockout.DefaultLockoutTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
options.Lockout.MaxFailedAccessAttempts = 5;
options.Lockout.AllowedForNewUsers = true;
// User settings.
options.User.AllowedUserNameCharacters =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789-._@+";
options.User.RequireUniqueEmail = false;
});
builder.Services.ConfigureApplicationCookie(options =>
{
// Cookie settings
options.Cookie.HttpOnly = true;
options.ExpireTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
options.LoginPath = "/Identity/Account/Login";
options.AccessDeniedPath = "/Identity/Account/AccessDenied";
options.SlidingExpiration = true;
});
var app = builder.Build();
if (app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
{
app.UseMigrationsEndPoint();
}
else
{
app.UseExceptionHandler("/Error");
app.UseHsts();
}
app.UseHttpsRedirection();
app.UseStaticFiles();
app.UseRouting();
app.UseAuthentication();
app.UseAuthorization();
app.MapRazorPages();
app.Run();
上述代码用默认选项值来配置 Identity。 可通过依赖关系注入向应用提供服务。
通过调用 UseAuthentication 启用 Identity。 UseAuthentication 向请求管道添加身份验证中间件。
模板生成的应用不使用授权。 app.UseAuthorization 会被包含来内，确保在应用添加授权时按正确的顺序添加它。 必须按上述代码中所示的顺序调用 UseRouting、UseAuthentication 和 UseAuthorization。
有关 IdentityOptions 的详细信息，请参阅 IdentityOptions 和应用程序启动。
构建 Register、Login、LogOut 和 RegisterConfirmation 的基架
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
添加 Register、Login、LogOut 和 RegisterConfirmation 文件。 按照将基架标识搭建到具有授权的 Razor 项目说明来生成本节中显示的代码。
如果创建的项目的名称为 WebApp1，并且未使用 SQLite，请运行以下命令。 否则，请为 ApplicationDbContext 使用正确的命名空间：
dotnet add package Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design
dotnet aspnet-codegenerator identity -dc WebApp1.Data.ApplicationDbContext --files "Account.Register;Account.Login;Account.Logout;Account.RegisterConfirmation"
使用 SQLite 时，追加 --useSqLite 或 -sqlite：
dotnet aspnet-codegenerator identity -dc WebApp1.Data.ApplicationDbContext --files "Account.Register;Account.Login;Account.Logout;Account.RegisterConfirmation" --useSqLite
PowerShell 使用分号作为命令分隔符。 使用 PowerShell 时，对文件列表中的分号进行转义，或者将文件列表放在双引号中，如上述示例所示。
有关基架 Identity 的详细信息，请参阅将基架标识搭建到具有授权的 Razor 项目。
检查注册
当用户单击 Register 页面上的“注册”按钮时，会调用 RegisterModel.OnPostAsync 操作。 CreateAsync(TUser) 在 _userManager 对象上创建用户：
public async Task
{
returnUrl = returnUrl ?? Url.Content("~/");
ExternalLogins = (await _signInManager.GetExternalAuthenticationSchemesAsync())
.ToList();
if (ModelState.IsValid)
{
var user = new IdentityUser { UserName = Input.Email, Email = Input.Email };
var result = await _userManager.CreateAsync(user, Input.Password);
if (result.Succeeded)
{
_logger.LogInformation("User created a new account with password.");
var code = await _userManager.GenerateEmailConfirmationTokenAsync(user);
code = WebEncoders.Base64UrlEncode(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(code));
var callbackUrl = Url.Page(
"/Account/ConfirmEmail",
pageHandler: null,
values: new { area = "Identity", userId = user.Id, code = code },
protocol: Request.Scheme);
await _emailSender.SendEmailAsync(Input.Email, "Confirm your email",
$"Please confirm your account by clicking here.");
if (_userManager.Options.SignIn.RequireConfirmedAccount)
{
return RedirectToPage("RegisterConfirmation",
new { email = Input.Email });
}
else
{
await _signInManager.SignInAsync(user, isPersistent: false);
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
}
foreach (var error in result.Errors)
{
ModelState.AddModelError(string.Empty, error.Description);
}
}
// If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
return Page();
}
禁用默认帐户验证
使用默认模板时，会将用户重定向到 Account.RegisterConfirmation，用户可以从中选择一个链接来确认帐户。 默认值 Account.RegisterConfirmation 仅用于测试，应在生产应用中禁用自动帐户验证。
若要要求使用已确认的帐户，并防止注册时立即登录，请在 /Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/RegisterConfirmation.cshtml.cs 中设置 DisplayConfirmAccountLink = false：
[AllowAnonymous]
public class RegisterConfirmationModel : PageModel
{
private readonly UserManager
private readonly IEmailSender _sender;
public RegisterConfirmationModel(UserManager
{
_userManager = userManager;
_sender = sender;
}
public string Email { get; set; }
public bool DisplayConfirmAccountLink { get; set; }
public string EmailConfirmationUrl { get; set; }
public async Task
{
if (email == null)
{
return RedirectToPage("/Index");
}
var user = await _userManager.FindByEmailAsync(email);
if (user == null)
{
return NotFound($"Unable to load user with email '{email}'.");
}
Email = email;
// Once you add a real email sender, you should remove this code that lets you confirm the account
DisplayConfirmAccountLink = false;
if (DisplayConfirmAccountLink)
{
var userId = await _userManager.GetUserIdAsync(user);
var code = await _userManager.GenerateEmailConfirmationTokenAsync(user);
code = WebEncoders.Base64UrlEncode(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(code));
EmailConfirmationUrl = Url.Page(
"/Account/ConfirmEmail",
pageHandler: null,
values: new { area = "Identity", userId = userId, code = code, returnUrl = returnUrl },
protocol: Request.Scheme);
}
return Page();
}
}
登录
在以下情况中，会显示“登录”窗体：
选择“登录”链接时。
用户尝试访问他们无权访问的受限页面，或者他们未通过系统身份验证时。
提交登录页上的窗体时，将调用 OnPostAsync 操作。 对 _signInManager 对象调用 PasswordSignInAsync。
public async Task
{
returnUrl = returnUrl ?? Url.Content("~/");
if (ModelState.IsValid)
{
// This doesn't count login failures towards account lockout
// To enable password failures to trigger account lockout,
// set lockoutOnFailure: true
var result = await _signInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(Input.Email,
Input.Password, Input.RememberMe, lockoutOnFailure: true);
if (result.Succeeded)
{
_logger.LogInformation("User logged in.");
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
if (result.RequiresTwoFactor)
{
return RedirectToPage("./LoginWith2fa", new
{
ReturnUrl = returnUrl,
RememberMe = Input.RememberMe
});
}
if (result.IsLockedOut)
{
_logger.LogWarning("User account locked out.");
return RedirectToPage("./Lockout");
}
else
{
ModelState.AddModelError(string.Empty, "Invalid login attempt.");
return Page();
}
}
// If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
return Page();
}
若要了解如何做出授权决定，请参阅 ASP.NET Core 中的授权简介。
注销
“注销”链接会调用 LogoutModel.OnPost 操作。
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.RazorPages;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace WebApp1.Areas.Identity.Pages.Account
{
[AllowAnonymous]
public class LogoutModel : PageModel
{
private readonly SignInManager
private readonly ILogger
public LogoutModel(SignInManager
{
_signInManager = signInManager;
_logger = logger;
}
public void OnGet()
{
}
public async Task
{
await _signInManager.SignOutAsync();
_logger.LogInformation("User logged out.");
if (returnUrl != null)
{
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
else
{
return RedirectToPage();
}
}
}
}
在前面的代码中，代码 return RedirectToPage(); 需要是重定向，这样浏览器才会执行新请求，用户的标识才会更新。
SignOutAsync 清除存储在 cookie 中的用户声明。
在 Pages/Shared/_LoginPartial.cshtml 中指定了 Post：
@using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity
@inject SignInManager
@inject UserManager
测试 Identity
默认 Web 项目模板允许匿名访问主页。 若要测试 Identity，请添加 [Authorize]：
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.RazorPages;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace WebApp1.Pages
{
[Authorize]
public class PrivacyModel : PageModel
{
private readonly ILogger
public PrivacyModel(ILogger
{
_logger = logger;
}
public void OnGet()
{
}
}
}
如果已登录，请注销。请运行应用并选择Privacy链接。 将被重定向到登录页。
了解 Identity
若要更详细地了解 Identity：
创建完整标识 UI 源
检查每个页面的源，并单步执行调试程序。
Identity 组件
所有依赖 Identity 的 NuGet 包都包含在 ASP.NET Core 共享框架中。
Identity 的主包是 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity。 此包包含 ASP.NET Core Identity 的核心接口集，并且由 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 包含。
迁移到 ASP.NET Core Identity
有关迁移现有 Identity 存储的详细信息和指导，请参阅迁移身份验证和 Identity。
设置密码强度
有关设置最小密码要求的示例，请查看配置。
AddDefaultIdentity 和 AddIdentity
ASP.NET Core 2.1 中引入了 AddDefaultIdentity。 调用 AddDefaultIdentity 类似于调用以下内容：
AddIdentity
AddDefaultUI
AddDefaultTokenProviders
有关详细信息，请参阅 AddDefaultIdentity 源。
禁止发布静态 Identity 资产
若要防止将静态 Identity 资产（Identity UI 的样式表和 JavaScript 文件）发布到 Web 根，请将以下 ResolveStaticWebAssetsInputsDependsOn 属性和 RemoveIdentityAssets 目标添加到应用的项目文件中：
后续步骤
ASP.NET Core Identity 源代码
如何在 ASP.NET Core 中使用角色Identity
若要了解如何使用 SQLite 配置 Identity，请查看此 GitHub 问题。
配置 Identity
通过授权保护的用户数据创建 ASP.NET Core 应用
在 ASP.NET Core 项目中向 Identity 添加和下载用户数据，以及从中删除用户数据
为 ASP.NET Core 中的 TOTP 验证器应用启用 QR 码生成
将身份验证和 Identity 迁移到 ASP.NET Core
ASP.NET Core 中的帐户确认和密码恢复
ASP.NET Core 中使用短信的双因素身份验证
在 Web 场中托管 ASP.NET Core
作者：Rick Anderson
ASP.NET Core Identity：
一个 API，它支持用户界面 (UI) 登录功能。
管理用户、密码、配置文件数据、角色、声明、令牌、电子邮件确认等等。
用户可使用存储在 Identity 中的登录信息创建帐户，或者可使用外部登录提供程序。 支持的外部登录提供程序包括 Facebook、Google、Microsoft 帐户和 Twitter。
有关如何全局要求所有用户进行身份验证的信息，请参阅需要通过身份验证的用户。
GitHub 上提供了 Identity 源代码。 Scaffold Identity 和查看生成的文件，以查看与 Identity 的模板交互。
Identity 通常使用 SQL Server 数据库进行配置，以存储用户名、密码和配置文件数据。 或者，可使用其他持久性存储，例如 Azure 表存储。
在本主题中，你将学习如何使用 Identity 来注册、登录和注销用户。 注意：模板会将用户的用户名和电子邮件看做是相同的。 若要更详细了解如何创建使用 Identity 的应用，请参阅后续步骤。
Microsoft 标识平台是：
Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) 开发人员平台的演变。
用于在 ASP.NET Core 应用中进行身份验证和授权的备用标识解决方案。
与 ASP.NET Core Identity 无关。
ASP.NET Core Identity 将用户界面 (UI) 登录功能添加到 ASP.NET Core Web 应用。 若要保护 Web API 和 SPA，请使用以下项之一：
Microsoft Entra ID
Azure Active Directory B2C (Azure AD B2C)
Duende IdentityServer。 Duende IdentityServer 是第三方产品。
Duende IdentityServer 是适用于 ASP.NET Core 的 OpenID Connect 和 OAuth 2.0 框架。 Duende IdentityServer 支持以下安全功能：
身份验证即服务 (AaaS)
跨多个应用程序类型的单一登录/注销 (SSO)
API 的访问控制
Federation Gateway
有关详细信息，请参阅 Duende IdentityServer 概述。
有关其他身份验证提供程序的详细信息，请参阅适用于 ASP.NET Core 的社区 OSS 身份验证选项
查看或下载示例代码（下载方法）。
创建使用身份验证的 Web 应用
使用个人用户帐户创建“ASP.NET Core Web 应用程序”项目。
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
选择“文件”>“新建”>“项目”。
选择“ASP.NET Core Web 应用程序”。 将项目命名为 WebApp1，使其命名空间与项目下载项相同。 单击“确定” 。
选择 ASP.NET Core Web 应用程序，然后选择“更改身份验证”。
选择“个人用户帐户”，然后单击“确定”。
dotnet new webapp --auth Individual -o WebApp1
上述命令使用 SQLite 创建 Razor Web 应用。 若要使用 LocalDB 创建 Web 应用，请运行以下命令：
dotnet new webapp --auth Individual -uld -o WebApp1
生成的项目将 ASP.NET Core Identity 作为 Razor 类库提供。 IdentityRazor 类库公开具有 Identity 区域的终结点。 例如：
/Identity/Account/Login
/Identity/Account/Logout
/Identity/Account/Manage
应用迁移
应用迁移以初始化数据库。
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
在包管理器控制台 (PMC) 中运行以下命令：
PM> Update-Database
使用 SQLite 时，此步骤不需要迁移。
如果尚未安装 dotnet ef，请安装它作为全局工具：
dotnet tool install --global dotnet-ef
有关 EF Core 的 CLI 的详细信息，请参阅 .NET CLI 的 EF Core 工具引用。
注意
默认情况下，要安装的 .NET 二进制文件的体系结构表示当前运行的 OS 体系结构。 若要指定不同的 OS 体系结构，请参阅 dotnet tool install, --arch option。
有关详细信息，请参阅 GitHub 问题 dotnet/AspNetCore.Docs #29262。
对于 LocalDB，请运行以下命令：
dotnet ef database update
测试注册和登录
运行应用并注册用户。 根据屏幕大小，你可能需要选择导航切换按钮来查看“注册”和“登录”链接。
查看 Identity 数据库
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
在“视图”菜单中选择“SQL Server 对象资源管理器”(SSOX)。
导航到“(localdb)MSSQLLocalDB(SQL Server 13)”。 右键单击“dbo.AspNetUsers”>“查看数据”：
可下载许多第三方工具来管理和查看 SQLite 数据库，例如 SQLite 的数据库浏览器。
配置 Identity 服务
这些服务添加在 ConfigureServices 中。 典型模式是调用所有 Add{Service} 方法，然后调用所有 services.Configure{Service} 方法。
public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
{
services.AddDbContext
// options.UseSqlite(
options.UseSqlServer(
Configuration.GetConnectionString("DefaultConnection")));
services.AddDefaultIdentity
.AddEntityFrameworkStores
services.AddRazorPages();
services.Configure
{
// Password settings.
options.Password.RequireDigit = true;
options.Password.RequireLowercase = true;
options.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = true;
options.Password.RequireUppercase = true;
options.Password.RequiredLength = 6;
options.Password.RequiredUniqueChars = 1;
// Lockout settings.
options.Lockout.DefaultLockoutTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
options.Lockout.MaxFailedAccessAttempts = 5;
options.Lockout.AllowedForNewUsers = true;
// User settings.
options.User.AllowedUserNameCharacters =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789-._@+";
options.User.RequireUniqueEmail = false;
});
services.ConfigureApplicationCookie(options =>
{
// Cookie settings
options.Cookie.HttpOnly = true;
options.ExpireTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
options.LoginPath = "/Identity/Account/Login";
options.AccessDeniedPath = "/Identity/Account/AccessDenied";
options.SlidingExpiration = true;
});
}
上述突出显示的代码用默认选项值来配置 Identity。 可通过依赖关系注入向应用提供服务。
通过调用 UseAuthentication 启用 Identity。 UseAuthentication 向请求管道添加身份验证中间件。
public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app, IWebHostEnvironment env)
{
if (env.IsDevelopment())
{
app.UseDeveloperExceptionPage();
app.UseDatabaseErrorPage();
}
else
{
app.UseExceptionHandler("/Error");
app.UseHsts();
}
app.UseHttpsRedirection();
app.UseStaticFiles();
app.UseRouting();
app.UseAuthentication();
app.UseAuthorization();
app.UseEndpoints(endpoints =>
{
endpoints.MapRazorPages();
});
}
public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
{
services.AddDbContext
// options.UseSqlite(
options.UseSqlServer(
Configuration.GetConnectionString("DefaultConnection")));
services.AddDatabaseDeveloperPageExceptionFilter();
services.AddDefaultIdentity
.AddEntityFrameworkStores
services.AddRazorPages();
services.Configure
{
// Password settings.
options.Password.RequireDigit = true;
options.Password.RequireLowercase = true;
options.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = true;
options.Password.RequireUppercase = true;
options.Password.RequiredLength = 6;
options.Password.RequiredUniqueChars = 1;
// Lockout settings.
options.Lockout.DefaultLockoutTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
options.Lockout.MaxFailedAccessAttempts = 5;
options.Lockout.AllowedForNewUsers = true;
// User settings.
options.User.AllowedUserNameCharacters =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789-._@+";
options.User.RequireUniqueEmail = false;
});
services.ConfigureApplicationCookie(options =>
{
// Cookie settings
options.Cookie.HttpOnly = true;
options.ExpireTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes(5);
options.LoginPath = "/Identity/Account/Login";
options.AccessDeniedPath = "/Identity/Account/AccessDenied";
options.SlidingExpiration = true;
});
}
上述代码用默认选项值来配置 Identity。 可通过依赖关系注入向应用提供服务。
通过调用 UseAuthentication 启用 Identity。 UseAuthentication 向请求管道添加身份验证中间件。
public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app, IWebHostEnvironment env)
{
if (env.IsDevelopment())
{
app.UseDeveloperExceptionPage();
app.UseMigrationsEndPoint();
}
else
{
app.UseExceptionHandler("/Error");
app.UseHsts();
}
app.UseHttpsRedirection();
app.UseStaticFiles();
app.UseRouting();
app.UseAuthentication();
app.UseAuthorization();
app.UseEndpoints(endpoints =>
{
endpoints.MapRazorPages();
});
}
模板生成的应用不使用授权。 app.UseAuthorization 会被包含来内，确保在应用添加授权时按正确的顺序添加它。 必须按上述代码中所示的顺序调用 UseRouting、UseAuthentication、UseAuthorization 和 UseEndpoints。
有关 IdentityOptions 和 Startup 的详细信息，请参阅 IdentityOptions 和应用程序启动。
构建 Register、Login、LogOut 和 RegisterConfirmation 的基架
Visual Studio
.NET Core CLI
添加 Register、Login、LogOut 和 RegisterConfirmation 文件。 按照将基架标识搭建到具有授权的 Razor 项目说明来生成本节中显示的代码。
如果创建的项目的名称为 WebApp1，并且未使用 SQLite，请运行以下命令。 否则，请为 ApplicationDbContext 使用正确的命名空间：
dotnet add package Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design
dotnet aspnet-codegenerator identity -dc WebApp1.Data.ApplicationDbContext --files "Account.Register;Account.Login;Account.Logout;Account.RegisterConfirmation"
使用 SQLite 时，追加 --useSqLite 或 -sqlite：
dotnet aspnet-codegenerator identity -dc WebApp1.Data.ApplicationDbContext --files "Account.Register;Account.Login;Account.Logout;Account.RegisterConfirmation" --useSqLite
PowerShell 使用分号作为命令分隔符。 使用 PowerShell 时，对文件列表中的分号进行转义，或者将文件列表放在双引号中，如上述示例所示。
有关基架 Identity 的详细信息，请参阅将基架标识搭建到具有授权的 Razor 项目。
检查注册
当用户单击 Register 页面上的“注册”按钮时，会调用 RegisterModel.OnPostAsync 操作。 CreateAsync(TUser) 在 _userManager 对象上创建用户：
public async Task
{
returnUrl = returnUrl ?? Url.Content("~/");
ExternalLogins = (await _signInManager.GetExternalAuthenticationSchemesAsync())
.ToList();
if (ModelState.IsValid)
{
var user = new IdentityUser { UserName = Input.Email, Email = Input.Email };
var result = await _userManager.CreateAsync(user, Input.Password);
if (result.Succeeded)
{
_logger.LogInformation("User created a new account with password.");
var code = await _userManager.GenerateEmailConfirmationTokenAsync(user);
code = WebEncoders.Base64UrlEncode(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(code));
var callbackUrl = Url.Page(
"/Account/ConfirmEmail",
pageHandler: null,
values: new { area = "Identity", userId = user.Id, code = code },
protocol: Request.Scheme);
await _emailSender.SendEmailAsync(Input.Email, "Confirm your email",
$"Please confirm your account by clicking here.");
if (_userManager.Options.SignIn.RequireConfirmedAccount)
{
return RedirectToPage("RegisterConfirmation",
new { email = Input.Email });
}
else
{
await _signInManager.SignInAsync(user, isPersistent: false);
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
}
foreach (var error in result.Errors)
{
ModelState.AddModelError(string.Empty, error.Description);
}
}
// If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
return Page();
}
禁用默认帐户验证
使用默认模板时，会将用户重定向到 Account.RegisterConfirmation，用户可以从中选择一个链接来确认帐户。 默认值 Account.RegisterConfirmation 仅用于测试，应在生产应用中禁用自动帐户验证。
若要要求使用已确认的帐户，并防止注册时立即登录，请在 /Areas/Identity/Pages/Account/RegisterConfirmation.cshtml.cs 中设置 DisplayConfirmAccountLink = false：
[AllowAnonymous]
public class RegisterConfirmationModel : PageModel
{
private readonly UserManager
private readonly IEmailSender _sender;
public RegisterConfirmationModel(UserManager
{
_userManager = userManager;
_sender = sender;
}
public string Email { get; set; }
public bool DisplayConfirmAccountLink { get; set; }
public string EmailConfirmationUrl { get; set; }
public async Task
{
if (email == null)
{
return RedirectToPage("/Index");
}
var user = await _userManager.FindByEmailAsync(email);
if (user == null)
{
return NotFound($"Unable to load user with email '{email}'.");
}
Email = email;
// Once you add a real email sender, you should remove this code that lets you confirm the account
DisplayConfirmAccountLink = false;
if (DisplayConfirmAccountLink)
{
var userId = await _userManager.GetUserIdAsync(user);
var code = await _userManager.GenerateEmailConfirmationTokenAsync(user);
code = WebEncoders.Base64UrlEncode(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(code));
EmailConfirmationUrl = Url.Page(
"/Account/ConfirmEmail",
pageHandler: null,
values: new { area = "Identity", userId = userId, code = code, returnUrl = returnUrl },
protocol: Request.Scheme);
}
return Page();
}
}
登录
在以下情况中，会显示“登录”窗体：
选择“登录”链接时。
用户尝试访问他们无权访问的受限页面，或者他们未通过系统身份验证时。
提交登录页上的窗体时，将调用 OnPostAsync 操作。 对 _signInManager 对象调用 PasswordSignInAsync。
public async Task
{
returnUrl = returnUrl ?? Url.Content("~/");
if (ModelState.IsValid)
{
// This doesn't count login failures towards account lockout
// To enable password failures to trigger account lockout,
// set lockoutOnFailure: true
var result = await _signInManager.PasswordSignInAsync(Input.Email,
Input.Password, Input.RememberMe, lockoutOnFailure: true);
if (result.Succeeded)
{
_logger.LogInformation("User logged in.");
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
if (result.RequiresTwoFactor)
{
return RedirectToPage("./LoginWith2fa", new
{
ReturnUrl = returnUrl,
RememberMe = Input.RememberMe
});
}
if (result.IsLockedOut)
{
_logger.LogWarning("User account locked out.");
return RedirectToPage("./Lockout");
}
else
{
ModelState.AddModelError(string.Empty, "Invalid login attempt.");
return Page();
}
}
// If we got this far, something failed, redisplay form
return Page();
}
若要了解如何做出授权决定，请参阅 ASP.NET Core 中的授权简介。
注销
“注销”链接会调用 LogoutModel.OnPost 操作。
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.RazorPages;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
namespace WebApp1.Areas.Identity.Pages.Account
{
[AllowAnonymous]
public class LogoutModel : PageModel
{
private readonly SignInManager
private readonly ILogger
public LogoutModel(SignInManager
{
_signInManager = signInManager;
_logger = logger;
}
public void OnGet()
{
}
public async Task
{
await _signInManager.SignOutAsync();
_logger.LogInformation("User logged out.");
if (returnUrl != null)
{
return LocalRedirect(returnUrl);
}
else
{
return RedirectToPage();
}
}
}
}
在前面的代码中，代码 return RedirectToPage(); 需要是重定向，这样浏览器才会执行新请求，用户的标识才会更新。
SignOutAsync 清除存储在 cookie 中的用户声明。
在 Pages/Shared/_LoginPartial.cshtml 中指定了 Post：
@using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity
@inject SignInManager
@inject UserManager
测试 Identity
默认 Web 项目模板允许匿名访问主页。 若要测试 Identity，请添加 [Authorize]：
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization;
using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.RazorPages;
using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging;
namespace WebApp1.Pages
{
[Authorize]
public class PrivacyModel : PageModel
{
private readonly ILogger
public PrivacyModel(ILogger
{
_logger = logger;
}
public void OnGet()
{
}
}
}
如果已登录，请注销。请运行应用并选择Privacy链接。 将被重定向到登录页。
了解 Identity
若要更详细地了解 Identity：
创建完整标识 UI 源
检查每个页面的源，并单步执行调试程序。
Identity 组件
所有依赖 Identity 的 NuGet 包都包含在 ASP.NET Core 共享框架中。
Identity 的主包是 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity。 此包包含 ASP.NET Core Identity 的核心接口集，并且由 Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 包含。
迁移到 ASP.NET Core Identity
有关迁移现有 Identity 存储的详细信息和指导，请参阅迁移身份验证和 Identity。
设置密码强度
有关设置最小密码要求的示例，请查看配置。
禁止发布静态 Identity 资产
若要防止将静态 Identity 资产（Identity UI 的样式表和 JavaScript 文件）发布到 Web 根，请将以下 ResolveStaticWebAssetsInputsDependsOn 属性和 RemoveIdentityAssets 目标添加到应用的项目文件中：
后续步骤
ASP.NET Core Identity 源代码
AddDefaultIdentity 源
若要了解如何使用 SQLite 配置 Identity，请查看此 GitHub 问题。
配置 Identity
通过授权保护的用户数据创建 ASP.NET Core 应用
在 ASP.NET Core 项目中向 Identity 添加和下载用户数据，以及从中删除用户数据
为 ASP.NET Core 中的 TOTP 验证器应用启用 QR 码生成
将身份验证和 Identity 迁移到 ASP.NET Core
ASP.NET Core 中的帐户确认和密码恢复
ASP.NET Core 中使用短信的双因素身份验证
在 Web 场中托管 ASP.NET Core
在 GitHub 上与我们协作
可以在 GitHub 上找到此内容的源，还可以在其中创建和查看问题和拉取请求。 有关详细信息，请参阅参与者指南。
ASP.NET Core
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参与
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使用条款
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© Microsoft 2024
IDENTITY中文(繁體)翻譯：劍橋詞典
IDENTITY中文(繁體)翻譯：劍橋詞典
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identity 在英語-中文（繁體）詞典中的翻譯
identitynoun [ C or U ] uk
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/aɪˈden.tə.ti/ us
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/aɪˈden.t̬ə.t̬i/
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B2 who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others
身份；本身；特性
The man's identity was being kept secret while he was helping police with enquiries.
這個男子在協助警方調查時，他的身份是保密的。
I cannot reveal the identity of my source.
我不能透露我的消息來源。
The informant was given a new identity (= a different name and new official documents) for protection.
給了線民一個新身分以作保護。
The newspaper photo apparently showed him in Rome but it was a case of mistaken identity (= it was the wrong person).
報紙上的照片似乎顯示他在羅馬，但其實那個人不是他。
In prison people often suffer from a loss of identity.
在獄中人們經常會失去自我。
I think my job gives me a sense of identity.
我覺得我的工作給了我一種認同感。
更多範例减少例句He was quite certain about his attacker's identity.He assumed a false identity in order to escape from the police.To conceal his identity, the man's words are being read by an actor.Through a process of deduction , the detectives discovered the identity of the killer.Australia has its own cultural identity, which is very different from that of Britain.
(identity在劍橋英語-中文（繁體）詞典的翻譯 © Cambridge University Press)
identity的例句
identity
It fails to demonstrate how identity constrains paths to social reform.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
In the second case, person is a bundle of his or her social identities, affiliations, and roles.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
It also suggests that traditional ways of telling the story overlook what sustains ordinary folk intent on finding religious meaning and identity.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
Some returned to join another garden on a false identity.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
Coherence can be partially ensured if different semantic identities are based on similar structural characteristics.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
The paper examines the contribution that gender roles and identities make to the overall configuration of resources available to particular individuals.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
Identity is certainly a tricky issue; one that appears to mean different things to different people.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
The identity of the authors whose work was targeted in this way is even more intriguing.
來自 Cambridge English Corpus
示例中的觀點不代表劍橋詞典編輯、劍橋大學出版社和其許可證頒發者的觀點。
B2
identity的翻譯
中文（簡體）
身份, 本身, 特性…
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identidad, identidad [feminine]…
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ஒரு நபர் யார், அல்லது ஒரு நபர் அல்லது குழுவின் குணங்கள் மற்றவர்களிடமிருந்து வேறுபடுகின்றன…
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особа…
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личность, отличительные черты, индивидуальность…
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ఒక వ్యక్తి ఎవరనేది, లేదా ఒక వ్యక్తి లేక సమూహాన్ని ఇతరులనుంచి వేరుచేసే లక్షణాలు…
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totožnost…
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在英語詞典中查看 identity 的釋義
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A flexitarian way of eating consists mainly of vegetarian food but with some meat.
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Forget doing it or forget to do it? Avoiding common mistakes with verb patterns (2)
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Identity（英语单词）_百度百科
tity（英语单词）_百度百科 网页新闻贴吧知道网盘图片视频地图文库资讯采购百科百度首页登录注册进入词条全站搜索帮助首页秒懂百科特色百科知识专题加入百科百科团队权威合作下载百科APP个人中心IDENTITY是一个多义词，请在下列义项上选择浏览（共6个义项）展开添加义项Identity播报讨论上传视频英语单词收藏查看我的收藏0有用+10Identity，主要用作名词，主要意思为“身份，本体；个性”等。 [1]外文名Identity词组the identity of interests同根词Identify词性名词图集目录1单词释义2短语搭配3双语例句基本信息外文名Identity词 组the identity of interests同根词Identify词 性名词英式音标[aɪˈdentəti]美式音标[aɪˈdentəti]单词释义播报编辑英 [aɪˈdentəti] 美 [aɪˈdentəti] n. 身份，本体；个性，特性；同一性，一致；恒等运算，恒等式[ 复数 identities ] [1]短语搭配播报编辑identity card 身份证cultural identity 文化身份；文化认同national identity 国家认同；民族认同brand identity 品牌识别；品牌标识；品牌同一性corporate identity 企业形象；企业标识identity theft 身份盗窃，身份盗用ethnic identity 族群认同，种族认同；民族认同visual identity 视觉识别personal identity 个人统合，个人身份；人格同一性gender identity 性别认同；性别认定；性（别）身份sense of identity 认同感；本体感identity document 身份证件；身分证明文件social identity 社会认同；社会身份identity crisis 认同的转折点identity certificate 身份证明书，身份证individual identity 个人统合identity management 身份管理；身份认证管理group identity 团体同一性；群体认同sexual identity 性认同；性身份；性自认identity politics 认同政治，身份政治 [1]双语例句播报编辑1、He closely guarded her identity. 他严密地保守她的身份。2、The thief used a false identity. 窃贼使用的是假身份。3、Do you have any proof of identity? 你有身份证明吗？ [1]新手上路成长任务编辑入门编辑规则本人编辑我有疑问内容质疑在线客服官方贴吧意见反馈投诉建议举报不良信息未通过词条申诉投诉侵权信息封禁查询与解封©2024 Baidu 使用百度前必读 | 百科协议 | 隐私政策 | 百度百科合作平台 | 京ICP证030173号 京公网安备110000020000欧路词典|英汉-汉英词典 identity是什么意思_identity的中文解释和发音_identity的翻译_identity怎么读
欧路词典|英汉-汉英词典 identity是什么意思_identity的中文解释和发音_identity的翻译_identity怎么读
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n. 身份；一性，一致；恒等式；特性
近义、反义、联想词
近义词n. personality, recognition, identification, operator, sameness联想词identification确;individuality个性, 个人特征, 特质;ethnicity种划分;authenticity可靠性;authorship著述;heritage遗产;persona人物角色;uniqueness唯一性;origin出身;gender性;authentication证明,鉴定;
词组 | 习惯用语
identity card 身份证cultural identity 文化身份；文化national identity 国家；brand identity 品牌识别；品牌标识；品牌一性corporate identity 企业形象；企业标识identity theft 身份盗窃，身份盗用ethnic identity 群，种；visual identity 视觉识别personal identity 个人统合，个人身份；人格一性gender identity 性别；性别定；性（别）身份sense of identity 感；本体感identity document 身份证件；身分证明文件social identity 社会；社会身份identity crisis 的转折点identity certificate 身份证明书，身份证individual identity 个人统合identity management 身份管理；身份证管理group identity 团体一性；群体sexual identity 性；性身份；性自identity politics 政治，身份政治
英语例句库
the identity of interests利益的一致reach (an) identity of views取得一致看法to reach an identity of views取得完全一致的看法he knows the identity of the bombers.他知道轰炸人员的身份。they wanted to reforge the identity of the nation.他们想要重新塑造特性。a man's body with an identity disc around the neck.一个男子的尸体，脖子上挂着一个身份圆牌。he resurfaced under a false identity in Australia.他在澳大利亚用假身份重新抛头露面了。Have you got your identity card handy?你是不是已把身份证取出放在手边了?The identity of these grey men of politics should be revealed.应揭露这些不露身份的政界人士的身份。He had to conceal his identity to escape the police.为了躲避警方, 他只好隐瞒身份。Please note the identities in the two cases.请注意这两个案子的相之处。The journalist did not want to reveal the identity of his informant. 那个新闻工作者不想透露消息提供人的身分。he used a second identity to defraud the bank of thousands of pounds.他用冒充身份骗取了银行成千上万英镑。the initiative created an identity between the City and the governing elite.立法提案权使伦敦城与执政精英之间达成一致。many people have been tricked by villains with false identity cards.许多人被持假身份证的流氓给骗了。On presentation of the relevant identity documents you may collect your property.你只要出示有关的身份证件就可以领取你的财产。She was fooled by his bogus identity card. 她被他的假身份证骗了。Azonic Studio provides Creative Graphic Desgin, Web Design, Brand Identity, Photography.领峰制作提供创意广告设计,网页设计,品牌形象设计,摄影.was asked for proof of his identity; an employment history that was proof of her dependability.要求证实他的身份；工作经历便可证实她的可靠性声明：以上例句、词性分类均由互联网资源自动生成，部分未经过人工审核，其表达内容亦不代表本软件的观点；若发现问题，欢迎向我们指正。显示所有包含 identity 的英语例句
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IDENTITY在剑桥英语词典中的解释及翻译
IDENTITY在剑桥英语词典中的解释及翻译
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identity 在英语中的意思
identitynoun uk
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/aɪˈden.tə.ti/ us
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/aɪˈden.t̬ə.t̬i/
identity noun
(WHO YOU ARE)
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B2 [ C or U ] a person's name and other facts about who they are: The man's identity was being kept secret while he was helping police with their enquiries. I cannot reveal the identity of my source. The informant was given a new identity (= a different name and new official documents) for protection.mistaken identity The newspaper photo apparently showed him in Rome but it was a case of mistaken identity (= it was the wrong person). 也请参见
identity parade
identity theft
[ C or U ] the fact of being, or feeling that you are, a particular type of person, organization, etc.; the qualities that make a person, organization, etc. different from others: a loss of identity In prison people often suffer from a loss of identity.a sense of identity I think my job gives me a sense of identity. It was important for me to carve out an identity separate from my husband's. cultural/national/ethnic identity 也请参见
brand identity
gender identity
identity crisis
identity politics
更多范例减少例句He was quite certain about his attacker's identity.At the border, agents take scans and photos which are used to confirm the travellers' identities. He assumed a false identity in order to escape from the police.To conceal his identity, the man's words are being read by an actor.Through a process of deduction , the detectives discovered the identity of the killer.Australia has its own cultural identity, which is very different from that of Britain.The idea of a united Europe is based on shared cultural and political identities.Her professional identity is fluid: how she describes her role depends on the situation and the needs of her clients.These long ago events were truly instrumental in shaping the identity of their faith.
“SMART 词汇”：相关单词和短语
Identifying
ascribe something to something
ascription
badged
badging
band
distinguishably
distinguishing
dog tag
geotag
id
ID card
microchip
over-identification
over-identify
passport
pick
pick someone/something out
reidentify
stamp
unplaceable
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Names and titles
Mind and personality
identity noun
(BEING THE SAME)
[ S or U ] formal the fact of being or feeling the same: identity between Here, there is a complete identity between his theology and his practice. identity with We begin with the image of a boy gazing into a pool and feeling an identity with what he sees.
更多范例减少例句It's quite surprising that you have perfect identity in many parts of the genome between human, mouse and rat.The writer notes a curious identity between the pursuer and the pursued.Karl Jung said that his compassion for animals stemmed from a primitive attitude of mind, an unconscious identity with animals.
“SMART 词汇”：相关单词和短语
Similar and the same
-esque
adjacent
affinity
akin
alike
allied
ballpark
congruent
ditto
equivalence
equivalency
equivalent
equivalently
non-distinctive
not make any difference idiom
of the kind idiom
one and the same idiom
or something (like that) idiom
respecter
synonymous
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identityadjective [ before noun ] uk
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/aɪˈden.tə.ti/ us
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/aɪˈden.t̬ə.t̬i/
showing or proving who someone is: You will need to show identity documents. Anyone can create an account with no identity verification. 也请参见
identity card
更多范例减少例句He was charged with possession of false identity papers. The newborn babies are all given identity bracelets. Please wear your identity badge throughout the conference.Each soldier wore an identity disc with his name and service number.
“SMART 词汇”：相关单词和短语
Identifying
ascribe something to something
ascription
badged
badging
band
distinguishably
distinguishing
dog tag
geotag
id
ID card
microchip
over-identification
over-identify
passport
pick
pick someone/something out
reidentify
stamp
unplaceable
查看更多结果»
你还可以在这些话题中找到相关的词、词组和同义词：
Names and titles
(identity在剑桥高级学习词典和同义词词典中的解释 © Cambridge University Press)
identity | 美式英语词典
identitynoun [ C ] us
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/ɑɪˈden·tɪ·t̬i/
identity noun [C]
(person)
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Add to word list
who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others: [ U ] As a journalist she refuses to reveal the identity of her source.
identity noun [C]
(mathematical statement)
algebra an equation (= mathematical statement) that is true for every value given to a variable (= number that can change)
(identity在剑桥学术词典中的解释 © Cambridge University Press)
identity | 商务英语
identitynoun [ C or U ] uk
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/aɪˈdentəti/ us
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plural identities
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Add to word list
the reputation, characteristics, etc. of a person or organization that makes the public think about them in a particular way: Companies often spend a fortune on branding in their attempts to communicate their identity.
who a person is, or information that proves who a person is, for example, their name and date of birth: When applying for a driver license or identification card, you must provide proof of your identity. confirm/prove your identity You may be asked to confirm your identity by phone.
也请参见
brand identity
corporate identity
(identity在剑桥商务英语词典中的解释 © Cambridge University Press)
identity的例句
identity
It also suggests that traditional ways of telling the story overlook what sustains ordinary folk intent on finding religious meaning and identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
A two-tiered transcription regulation mechanism that protects germ cell identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Some returned to join another garden on a false identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Each of these (identity matching and supramodal representations) is based on the assumption that integration of vision and hearing occurs within the observer.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
In so doing, he treats the parties' identities as having been established.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
It fails to demonstrate how identity constrains paths to social reform.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
In both of these situations, social subjects enact authentication by historicizing their identities through claims of linguistic continuity with a valued past.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
In the second case, person is a bundle of his or her social identities, affiliations, and roles.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
The paper examines the contribution that gender roles and identities make to the overall configuration of resources available to particular individuals.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
If the identity of the nearest competitor is important, then the margin of victory over this competitor should be a significant constraint on expenditure decisions.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Identity is certainly a tricky issue; one that appears to mean different things to different people.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Coherence can be partially ensured if different semantic identities are based on similar structural characteristics.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
Accounts of taking charge and assertions of robust identities tended to dominate the early interviews.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
The identity of the authors whose work was targeted in this way is even more intriguing.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
The internet has thus functioned for the burgeoning movement as an anchor and definer of identity.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
示例中的观点不代表剑桥词典编辑、剑桥大学出版社和其许可证颁发者的观点。
包含identity的固定搭配
identity
这些词常常与identity一起使用。点击固定搭配，查看更多示例。
aspect of identityThe travails of one meso-scale aspect of identity, ethnicity, are instructive.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
civic identityAnd the effort to discern and preserve civic identity is a defining task of politics.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
collective identityThis consciousness is historically grounded, giving recognition and value to a form of society and collective identity which predates the nation-state.
来自 Cambridge English Corpus
示例均来自剑桥英语语料库及网络资源。示例中的观点不代表剑桥词典编辑、剑桥大学出版社和其许可证颁发者的观点。
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B2
identity的翻译
中文（繁体）
身份, 本身, 特性…
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中文（简体）
身份, 本身, 特性…
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西班牙语
identidad, identidad [feminine]…
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葡萄牙语
identidade, identidade [feminine]…
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in Marathi
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in Swedish
马来语
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in Urdu
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in Telugu
阿拉伯语
in Bengali
捷克语
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韩语
意大利语
ओळख…
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身元, 独自性, 固有性…
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kimlik, hüviyet, belirleyici/tanımlayıcı özellik…
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identité [feminine], identité…
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identitat…
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identiteit…
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ஒரு நபர் யார், அல்லது ஒரு நபர் அல்லது குழுவின் குணங்கள் மற்றவர்களிடமிருந்து வேறுபடுகின்றன…
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पहचान…
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ઓળખ…
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identitet…
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identitet…
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identiti…
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die Identität…
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identitet [masculine], identitet…
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شناخت, نام و نشان (کسی شخص یا گروپ کی خصوصیات کی نشاندہی کرنا، ظاہر کرنا)…
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особа…
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личность, отличительные черты, индивидуальность…
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ఒక వ్యక్తి ఎవరనేది, లేదా ఒక వ్యక్తి లేక సమూహాన్ని ఇతరులనుంచి వేరుచేసే లక్షణాలు…
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هُويّة…
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পরিচয়…
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totožnost…
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identitas…
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รูปพรรณสัณฐาน…
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nhân dạng…
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tożsamość…
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신원, 정체성…
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identità…
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identify
identify with someone
identifying
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identity
identity card
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identity的更多意思
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identity theft
non-identity
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A flexitarian way of eating consists mainly of vegetarian food but with some meat.
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identity (WHO YOU ARE)
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Identity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Identity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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IdentityFirst published Wed Dec 15, 2004; substantive revision Wed Jul 20, 2022
Much of the debate about identity in recent decades has been about
personal identity, and specifically about personal identity over time,
but identity generally, and the identity of things of other kinds,
have also attracted attention. Various interrelated problems have been
at the centre of discussion, but it is fair to say that recent work
has focussed particularly on the following areas: the notion of a
criterion of identity; the correct analysis of identity over time,
and, in particular, the disagreement between advocates of perdurance
and advocates of endurance as analyses of identity over time; the
notion of identity across possible worlds and the question of its
relevance to the correct analysis of de re modal discourse;
the notion of contingent identity; the question of whether the
identity relation is, or is similar to, the composition relation; and
the notion of vague identity. A radical position, advocated by Peter
Geach, is that these debates, as usually conducted, are void for lack
of a subject matter: the notion of absolute identity they
presuppose has no application; there is only relative
identity. Another increasingly popular view is the one advocated by
David Lewis: although the debates make sense they cannot genuinely be
debates about identity, since there are no philosophical problems
about identity. Identity is an utterly unproblematic notion. What
there are, are genuine problems which can be stated using the language
of identity. But since these can be restated without the language of
identity they are not problems about identity. (For example, it is a
puzzle, an aspect of the so-called “problem of personal
identity”, whether the same person can have different
bodies at different times. But this is just the puzzle whether
a person can have different bodies at different times. So
since it can be stated without the language of personal
“identity”, it is not a problem about personal
identity, but about personhood.) This article provides an
overview of the topics indicated above, some assessment of the debates
and suggestions for further reading.
1. Introduction
2. The Logic of Identity
3. Relative Identity
4. Criteria of identity
5. Identity over time
6. Identity across possible worlds
7. Contingent identity
8. Composition as Identity
9. Vague identity
10. Are there philosophical problems about identity?
Bibliography
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
1. Introduction
To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same.
“Identity” and “sameness” mean the same; their
meanings are identical. However, they have more than one meaning. A
distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and
numerical identity or sameness. Things with qualitative
identity share properties, so things can be more or less qualitatively
identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively identical because
they share the property of being a dog, and such properties as go
along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater
qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total,
qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself.
Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity
relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number)
things: x and y are to be properly counted as one
just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).
Numerical identity is our topic. As noted, it is at the centre of
several philosophical debates, but to many seems in itself wholly
unproblematic, for it is just that relation everything has to itself
and nothing else – and what could be less problematic than that?
Moreover, if the notion is problematic it is difficult to see how the
problems could be resolved, since it is difficult to see how a thinker
could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept
of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. The basicness of the
notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the
link between identity and quantification has been particularly noted
by Quine (1964).
2. The Logic of Identity
Numerical identity can be characterised, as just done, as the relation
everything has to itself and to nothing else. But this is circular,
since “nothing else” just means “no numerically
non-identical thing”. It can be defined, equally circularly
(because quantifying over all equivalence relations including itself),
as the smallest equivalence relation (an equivalence relation being
one which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, for example, having
the same shape). Other circular definitions are available. Usually it
is defined as the equivalence relation (or: the reflexive relation)
satisfying Leibniz’s Law, the principle of the indiscernibility
of identicals, that if x is identical with y then
everything true of x is true of y. Intuitively this
is right, but only picks out identity uniquely if “what is true
of x” is understood to include “being identical
with x”; otherwise it is too weak. Circularity is thus
not avoided. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s Law appears to be crucial
to our understanding of identity, and, more particularly, to our
understanding of distinctness: we exhibit our commitment to it
whenever we infer from “Fa” and
“Not-Fb” that a is not identical with
b. Strictly, what is being employed in such inferences is the
contrapositive of Leibniz’s Law (if something true of a
is false of b, a is not identical with b),
which some (in the context of the discussion of vague identity) have
questioned, but it appears as indispensable to our grip on the concept
of identity as Leibniz’s Law itself.
The converse of Leibniz’s Law, the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles, that if everything true of x is true of
y, x is identical with y, is
correspondingly trivial if “what is true of x” is
understood to include “being identical with x”
(as required if Leibniz’s Law is to characterise identity
uniquely among equivalence relations). But often it is read with
“what is true of x” restricted, e.g., to
qualitative, non-relational, properties of x. It then becomes
philosophically controversial. Thus it is debated whether a
symmetrical universe is possible, e.g., a universe containing two
qualitatively indistinguishable spheres and nothing else (Black
1952).
Leibniz’s Law has itself been subject to controversy in the
sense that the correct explanation of apparent counter-examples has
been debated. Leibniz’s Law must be clearly distinguished from
the substitutivity principle, that if “a” and
“b” are codesignators (if
“a=b” is a true sentence of English)
they are everywhere substitutable salva veritate. This
principle is trivially false. “Hesperus” contains eight
letters, “Phosphorus” contains ten, but Hesperus (the
Evening Star) is Phosphorus (the Morning Star). Again, despite the
identity, it is informative to be told that Hesperus is Phosphorus,
but not to be told that Hesperus is Hesperus (“On Sense and
Reference” in Frege 1969). Giorgione was so-called because of
his size, Barbarelli was not, but Giorgione was Barbarelli (Quine,
“Reference and Modality”, in 1963) . It is a necessary
truth that 9 is greater than 7, it is not a necessary truth that the
number of planets is greater than 7, although 9 is the number of
planets. The explanation of the failure of the substitutivity
principle can differ from case to case. In the first example, it is
plausible to say that “‘Hesperus’ contains eight
letters” is not about Hesperus, but about the name, and the same
is true, mutatis mutandis, of “‘Phosphorus’
contains ten letters”. Thus the names do not have the same
referents in the identity statement and the predications. In the
Giorgione/Barbarelli example this seems less plausible. Here the
correct explanation is plausibly that “is so-called because of
his size” expresses different properties depending on the name
it is attached to, and so expresses the property of being called
“Barbarelli” because of his size when attached to
“Barbarelli” and being called “Giorgione”
because of his size when attached to “Giorgione”. It is
more controversial how to explain the Hesperus/Phosphorus and 9/the
number of planets examples. Frege’s own explanation of the
former was to assimilate it to the
“Hesperus”/“Phosphorus” case: in “It is
informative to be told that Hesperus is Phosphorus” the names do
not stand for their customary referent but for their senses. A Fregean
explanation of the 9/number of planets example may also be offered:
“it is necessary that” creates a context in which
numerical designators stand for senses rather than numbers.
For present purposes the important point to recognise is that, however
these counter-examples to the substitutivity principle are explained,
they are not counter-examples to Leibniz’s Law, which says
nothing about substitutivity of codesignators in any language.
The view of identity just put forward (henceforth “the classical
view”) characterises it as the equivalence relation which
everything has to itself and to nothing else and which satisfies
Leibniz’s Law. These formal properties ensure that, within any
theory expressible by means of a fixed stock of one- or many-place
predicates, quantifiers and truth-functional connectives, any two
predicates which can be regarded as expressing identity (i.e., any
predicates satisfying the two schemata “for all x,
Rxx” and “for all x, for all y,
Rxy → (Fx → Fy)” for any
one-place predicate in place of “F”) will be
extensionally equivalent. They do not, however, ensure that any
two-place predicate does express identity within a particular theory,
for it may simply be that the descriptive resources of the theory are
insufficiently rich to distinguish items between which the equivalence
relation expressed by the predicate holds (“Identity” in
Geach 1972).
Following Geach, call a two-place predicate with these properties in a
theory an “I-predicate” in that theory. Relative to
another, richer, theory the same predicate, interpreted in the same
way, may not be an I-predicate. If so it will not, and did not even in
the poorer theory, express identity. For example, “having the
same income as” will be an I-predicate in a theory in which
persons with the same income are indistinguishable, but not in a
richer theory.
Quine (1950) has suggested that when a predicate is an I-predicate in
a theory only because the language in which the theory is expressed
does not allow one to distinguish items between which it holds, one
can reinterpret the sentences of the theory so that the I-predicate in
the newly interpreted theory does express identity. Every sentence
will have just the same truth-conditions under the new interpretation
and the old, but the references of its subsentential parts will be
different. Thus, Quine suggests, if one has a language in which one
speaks of persons and in which persons of the same income are
indistinguishable the predicates of the language may be reinterpreted
so that the predicate which previously expressed having the same
income comes now to express identity. The universe of discourse
now consists of income groups, not people. The extensions of the
monadic predicates are classes of income groups, and, in general, the
extension of an n-place predicate is a class of
n-member sequences of income groups (Quine 1963:
65–79). Any two-place predicate expressing an equivalence
relation could be an I-predicate relative to some sufficiently
impoverished theory, and Quine’s suggestion will be applicable
to any such predicate if it is applicable at all.
But it remains that it is not guaranteed that a two-place predicate
that is an I-predicate in the theory to which it belongs expresses
identity. In fact, no condition can be stated in a first-order
language for a predicate to express identity, rather than mere
indiscernibility by the resources of the language. However, in a
second-order language, in which quantification over all
properties (not just those for which the language contains predicates)
is possible and Leibniz’s Law is therefore statable, identity
can be uniquely characterised. Identity is thus not first-order, but
only second-order definable.
3. Relative Identity
This situation provides the basis for Geach’s radical contention
that the notion of absolute identity has no application and that there
is only relative identity. This section contains a brief discussion of
Geach’s complex view. (For more details see the entry on
relative identity,
Deutsch 1997, Dummett 1981 and 1991, Hawthorne 2003 and Noonan 2017.)
Geach maintains that since no criterion can be given by which a
predicate expressing an I-predicate may be determined to express, not
merely indiscernibility relative to the language to which it belongs,
but also absolute indiscernibility, we should jettison the classical
notion of identity (1991). He dismisses the possibility of defining
identity in a second-order language on the ground of the paradoxical
nature of unrestricted quantification over properties and aims his
fire particularly at Quine’s proposal that an I-predicate in a
first-order theory may always be interpreted as expressing
absolute identity (even if such an interpretation is not
required). Geach objects that Quine’s suggestion leads
to a “Baroque Meinongian ontology” and is inconsistent
with Quine’s own expressed preference for “desert
landscapes” (“Identity” in Geach 1972: 245).
We may usefully state Geach’s thesis using the terminology of
absolute and relative equivalence relations. Let us say that an
equivalence relation R is absolute if and only if, if
x stands in it to y, there cannot be some other
equivalence relation S, holding between anything and either
x or y, but not holding between x and
y. If an equivalence relation is not absolute it is relative.
Classical identity is an absolute equivalence relation. Geach’s
main contention is that any expression for an absolute equivalence
relation in any possible language will have the null class as its
extension, and so there can be no expression for classical identity in
any possible language. This is the thesis he argues against Quine.
Geach also maintains the sortal relativity of identity statements,
that “x is the same A as y”
does not “split up” into “x is an
A and y is an A and
x=y”. More precisely stated, what Geach denies
is that whenever a term “A” is interpretable as a
sortal term in a language L (a term which makes (independent)
sense following “the same”) the expression (interpretable
as) “x is the same A as y” in
language L will be satisfied by a pair
satisfied by
the sortal relativity of identity thus neither entails nor is entailed
by his thesis of the inexpressibility of identity. It is the sortal
relativity thesis that is the central issue between Geach and Wiggins
(1967 and 1980). It entails that a relation expressible in the form
“x is the same A as y” in a
language L, where “A” is a sortal term
in L, need not entail indiscernibility even by the resources
of L.
Geach’s argument against Quine exists in two versions, an
earlier and a later.
In its earlier version the argument is merely that following
Quine’s suggestion to interpret a language in which some
expression is an I-predicate so that the I-predicate expresses
classical identity sins against a highly intuitive methodological
programme enunciated by Quine himself, namely that as our knowledge
expands we should unhesitatingly expand our ideology, our stock of
predicables, but should be much more wary about altering our ontology,
the interpretation of our bound name variables (1972: 243).
Geach’s argument is that in view of the mere possibility of
carving out of a language L, in which the relational
expressions, E1, E2,
E3… are not I-predicates, sub-languages
L1, L2,
L3… in which these expressions are
I-predicates, if Quine’s suggested proposal of reinterpretation
is possible for each Ln, the user of
L will be committed to any number of entities not quantified
over in L, namely, for each Ln,
those entities for which the I-predicate of
Ln (En)
gives a criterion of absolute identity. This will be so because any
sentence of L will retain its truth conditions in any
Ln to which it belongs, reinterpreted as
Quine proposes, but “of course, it is flatly inconsistent to say
that as a member of a large theory a sentence retains its
truth-conditions but not its ontological commitment”
(1973:299).
The crucial premiss of this argument is thus that sameness of
truth-conditions entails sameness of ontological commitment. But this
is not true. The ontological commitments of a theory (according to
Quine, whose notion this is) are those entities that must lie within
the domain of quantification of the theory if the theory is to be
true; or, the entities the predicates of the theory have to be true of
if the theory is to be true. A theory is not ontologically committed,
we may say, to whatever has to be in the universe for it to
be true, but only to whatever has to be in its universe for
it to be true. Thus there is no argument from sameness of
truth-conditions to sameness of ontological commitments.
The later version of Geach’s argument needs a different
response. The difference between the earlier version and the later one
is that in the later (to be found in Geach 1973) Geach’s claim
is not merely that Quine’s thesis about possible
reinterpretation has a consequence which is unpalatable, but that it
leads to an out-and-out logical absurdity, the existence of what he
calls “absolute surmen” (entities for which having the
same surname constitutes a criterion of absolute identity, i.e.,
entails indiscernibility in all respects). Because Geach is now making
this stronger claim, the objection that his argument depends upon the
incorrect assumption that sameness of truth-conditions entails
sameness of ontological commitment is no longer relevant. In order to
make out his case Geach has to establish just two points. First, that
there are sentences of English supplemented by the predicate “is
the same surman as” (explained to mean “is a man and has
the same surname as”), which are evidently true and which,
considered as sentences of that fragment of English in which “is
the same surman as” is an I-predicate, when this is interpreted
in the way Quine suggests, can be true only if absolute surmen exist.
And secondly, that the existence of absolute surmen is absurd.
But in the end Geach fails to establish these two points. Quine would
say that, for the fragment of English in question, the domain of the
variables can be considered to consist of classes of men with the same
surname and the predicates interpreted as holding of such classes.
Thus, the predicate “is the same surman as” will no longer
be true of pairs of men if we adopt Quine’s suggestion
(I am writing, remember in English, not in the fragment of English
under discussion), but rather of pairs of classes of men with the same
surname – these then will be Geach’s “absolute
surmen”. Now, Geach attempts to rule this out by the argument
that “whatever is a surman is by definition a man.” But
this argument fails. The predicate “is a man” will also be
in the language-fragment in which “is the same surman as”
is the I-predicate; and so it, too, will, be reinterpreted, if we
follow Quine’s suggestion, as holding of classes of men with the
same surname. Thus the sentence “Whatever is a surman is a
man” will be true in the language fragment interpreted in
Quine’s way, just as it is in English as a whole. What will not
be true, however, is that whatever the predicate “is a
surman” is true of, as it occurs in the language-fragment
reinterpreted in Quine’s way, is a thing of which “is
a man”, as it occurs in English as a whole, is true of.
But Geach has no right to demand that this should be the case. Even
so, this demand can be met. For the domain of the interpretation of
the language fragment in which “is the same surman as” is
the I-predicate can, in fact, be taken to consist of men, namely, to
be a class containing exactly one representative man for each class of
men with the same surname. Thus, as Geach says, absolute surmen will
be just some among men (1973, 100). Geach goes on, “there will,
for example, be just one surman with the surname ‘Jones’,
but if this is an absolute surman, and he is a certain man, then which
of the Jones boys is he?” But this question, which is, of
course, only answerable using predicates which belong to the part of
English not included in the language fragment in which “is the
same surman as” is the I-predicate, is not an impossible one to
answer. It is merely that the answer will depend upon the particular
interpretation that the language fragment has, in fact, been given.
Geach is, therefore not entitled to go on, “Surely we have run
into an absurdity.” It thus seems that his argument for the
non-existence of absolute identity fails.
Geach’s argument for his second thesis, that of the sortal
relativity of identity, is that it provides the best solution to a
variety of well known puzzles about identity and counting at a time
and over time. The most well known puzzle is that of the cat on the
mat, which comes in two versions.
The first version goes like this. (Wiggins 1968 contains the first
appearance of this version in present-day philosophical literature; an
equivalent puzzle is that of Dion and Theon, see Burke 1995.) Suppose
a cat, Tibbles, is sitting on a mat. Now consider that portion of
Tibbles that includes everything except its tail – its
“tail complement” – and call it “Tib”.
Tib is smaller than Tibbles so they are not identical. But what if we
now amputate the cat’s tail? (A time-reversed, or
“growing”, version can be considered in which a tail is
grafted on to a tailless cat; the same responses considered below will
be available, but may differ in relative plausibility.) Tibbles and
Tib will now coincide. If Tibbles is still a cat, it is hard to see by
what criterion one could deny that Tib is a cat. Yet they are distinct
individuals, since they have different histories. But there is just
one cat on the mat. So they cannot be distinct cats. They must be the
same cat, even though they are distinct individuals; and so identity
under the sortal concept cat must be a relative identity
relation.
The second version (presented in Geach 1980, compare Unger 1980) goes
as follows. Tibbles is sitting on the mat and is the only cat sitting
on the mat. But Tibbles has at least 1,000 hairs. Geach continues:
Now let c be the largest continuous mass of feline tissue on
the mat. Then for any of our 1,000 cat-hairs, say
hn, there is a proper part
cn of c which contains precisely
all of c except the hair hn; and
every such part cn differs in a
describable way both from any other such part say
cm, and from c as a whole.
Moreover, fuzzy as the concept cat may be, it is clear that
not only is c a cat, but also any part
cn is a cat:
cn would clearly be a cat were the hair
hn to be plucked out, and we cannot
reasonably suppose that plucking out a hair generates a cat,
so cn must already have been a cat.
(Geach 1980, 215)
The conclusion, of course, is the same as in the previous version of
the argument: there is only one cat on the mat so all the distinct
entities that qualify as cats must be the same cat.
This version of the argument can be resisted by insisting that the
concept of a cat is maximal, i.e. no proper part of a cat is a cat.
The first version may be resisted in a variety of ways. Some deny the
existence of the tail-complement at all (van Inwagen 1981, Olson
1995); others deny that the tail-complement survives the amputation
(Burke 1995). Another possibility is to say that certain of the
historical and/or modal predicates possessed by Tibbles and not Tib
are essential to being a cat, so that Tib is not (predicatively) a cat
(Wiggins 1980). Again, it can be accepted that both Tib and Tibbles
are cats, but deny that in counting them as one we are counting by
identity, rather, we are counting by “almost identity”
(Lewis 1993). Another possibility is to accept that both Tib and
Tibbles are cats, but deny that they are distinct: rather
“Tib” and “Tibbles” are two names of the same
cat-stage (Hawley 2001, Sider 2001).
There is, then, no very compelling argument for Geach’s sortal
relativity thesis to be based on such examples, given the variety of
responses available, some of which will be returned to below. On the
other hand, no alternative solution to the puzzle of the cat on the
mat stands out as clearly superior to the rest, or clearly superior to
the sortal relativity thesis as a solution. We should conclude that
this component of Geach’s position, though not proven, is not
refuted either, and, possibly, that the linguistic data provide no
basis for a decision for or against.
4. Criteria of identity
A notion that Geach deploys extensively, and which is also in common
use by his opponents, is that of a criterion of identity, a standard
by which identity is to be judged. This section will attempt to
untangle some of the complexities this notion involves.
The notion of a criterion of identity was introduced into
philosophical terminology by Frege (1884) and strongly emphasised by
Wittgenstein (1958). Exactly how it is to be interpreted and the
extent of its applicability are still matters of debate.
A considerable obstacle to understanding contemporary philosophical
usage of the term, however, is that the notion does not seem to be a
unitary one. In the case of abstract objects (the case discussed by
Frege) the criterion of identity for Fs is thought of as an
equivalence relation holding between objects distinct from
Fs. Thus the criterion of identity for directions is
parallelism of lines, that is, the direction of line
a is identical with the direction of line b if and
only if line a is parallel to line b. The criterion
of identity for numbers is equinumerosity of concepts, that
is, the number of As is identical with the number of
Bs if and only if there are exactly as many As as
Bs. The relation between the criterion of identity for
Fs and the criterion of application for the concept
F (the standard for the application of the concept to an
individual) is then said by some (Wright and Hale 2001) to be that to
be an F is just to be something for which questions of
identity and distinctness are to settled by appeal to the criterion of
identity for Fs. (Thus, when Frege went on to give an
explicit definition of numbers as extensions of concepts he appealed
to it only to deduce what has come to be called Hume’s Principle
– his statement of his criterion of identity for numbers in
terms of equinumerosity of concepts, and emphasised that he regarded
the appeal to extensions as inessential.) In the case of concrete
objects, however, things seem to stand differently. Often the
criterion of identity for a concrete object of type F is said
to be a relation R such that for any Fs, x
and y, x=y if and only if Rxy. In
this case the criterion of identity for Fs is not stated as a
relation between entities distinct from Fs and the criterion
of identity cannot plausibly be thought of as determining the
criterion of application. Another example of the lack of uniformity in
the notion of a criterion of identity in contemporary philosophy is,
in the case of concrete objects, a distinction customarily made
between a criterion of diachronic identity and a criterion of
synchronic identity; the former taking the form “x is
at t the same F as y is at
t′ if and only if…”, where what fills the
gap is some statement of a relation holding between objects x
and y and times t and t′. (In the
case of persons, for example, a candidate criterion of diachronic
identity is: x is at t the same person as y
is at t′ if and only if x at t is
psychologically continuous with y at t′.) A
criterion of synchronic identity, by contrast, will typically specify
how the parts of an F-thing existing at a time must be
related, or how one F at a time is marked off from
another.
One way of bringing system into the discussion of criteria of identity
is to make use of the distinction between one-level and two-level
criteria of identity (Williamson 1990, Lowe 2012). The Fregean
criteria of identity for directions and numbers are two-level. The
objects for which the criterion is given are distinct from, and can be
pictured as at a higher level than, the entities between which the
relation specified holds. A two-level criterion for the Fs
takes the form (restricting ourselves to examples in which the
criterial relation holds between objects):
If x is a G and y is a G then
d(x) = d(y) iff Rxy
e.g., If x and y are lines then the direction of
x is identical with the direction of y iff
x and y are parallel.
A two-level criterion of identity is thus in the first place an
implicit definition of a function “d( )”
(e.g., “the direction of”) in terms of which the sortal
predicate “is an F” can be defined (“is a
direction” can be defined as “is the direction of some
line”). Consistently with the two-level criterion of identity
stated several distinct functions may be the reference of the functor
“d”. Hence, as emphasised by Lowe (1997: section
6), two-level criteria of identity are neither definitions of
identity, nor of identity restricted to a certain sort (for identity
is universal), nor even of the sortal terms denoting the sorts for
which they provide criteria. They merely constrain, but not to
uniqueness, the possible referents of the functor “d” they
implicitly define and they thus give a merely necessary condition for
falling under the sortal predicate “is an F”
(where “x is an F” is explained to mean
“for some y, x is identical with
d(y)”).
On the other hand, the criterion of identity for sets given by the
Axiom of Extensionality (sets are the same iff they have the same
members), unlike the criterion of identity for numbers given by
Hume’s Principle, and Davidson’s criterion of event
identity (events are the same iff they have the same causes and
effects (“The Individuation of Events” in his 1980)) are
one-level: the objects for which the criterion of identity is stated
are the same as those between which the criterial relation obtains. In
general, a one-level criterion for objects of sort F takes
the form:
If x is an F and y is an F then
x=y iff Rxy
Not all criteria of identity can be two-level (on pain of infinite
regress), and it is tempting to think that the distinction between
objects for which a two-level criterion is possible and those for
which only a one-level criterion is possible coincides with that
between abstract and concrete objects (and so, that a two-level
criterion for sets must be possible).
However, a more general application of the two-level notion is
possible. In fact, it can be applied to any type of object K,
such that the criterion of identity for Ks can be thought of
as an equivalence relation between a distinct type of object,
K*s, but some such objects may intuitively be regarded as
concrete.
How general this makes its application is a matter of controversy. In
particular, if persisting things are thought of as composed of
(instantaneous) temporal parts (see discussion below), the problem of
supplying a diachronic criterion of identity for persisting concrete
objects can be regarded as the problem of providing a two-level
criterion. But if persisting things are not thought of in this way
then not all persisting things can be provided with two-level
criteria. (Though some can. For example, it is quite plausible that
the criterion of identity over time for persons should be thought of
as given by a relation between bodies.)
As noted by Lowe (1997) and Wright and Hale (2001) any two-level
criterion can be restated in a one-level form (though, of course, not
conversely). For example, to say that the direction of line a
is identical with the direction of line b if and only if line
a is parallel to line b is to say that directions
are the same if and only if the lines they are of are parallel, which
is the form of a one-level criterion. A way of unifying the various
different ways of talking of criteria of identity is thus to take as
the paradigmatic form of a statement of a criterion of identity a
statement of the form: for any x, for any y, if
x is an F and y is an F then
x=y if and only if Rxy (Lowe 1989,
1997).
If the notion is interpreted in this way then the relation between the
criterion of identity and the criterion of application will be that of
one-way determination. The criterion of identity will be determined
by, but not determine, the criterion of application.
For, in general, a one-level criterion of identity for Fs as
explained above is equivalent to the conjunction of:
If x is an F then Rxx
and
If x is an F then if y is an F and
Rxy then x=y
Each of these gives a merely necessary condition for being an
F. And the second says something about Fs which is
not true of everything only if “Rxy” does not
entail “x=y”
Together these are equivalent to the proposition that every F
is the F “R-related” to it. By its form
this states a merely necessary condition for being a thing of sort
“F”. The one-level criterion of identity thus
again merely specifies a necessary condition of being an object of
sort “F”.
Hence, once the necessary and sufficient conditions of being an
“F” are laid down, no further stipulation is
required of a criterion of “F”-identity, whether
one-level or two-level.
This conclusion is, of course, in agreement with Lewis’s view
that there are no genuine problems about identity as such (Lewis 1986,
Ch. 4), but it is in tension with the thought that sortal concepts, as
distinct from adjectival concepts, are to be characterised by their
involvement of criteria of identity as well as criteria of
application.
A conception of identity criteria which allows this characterisation
of the notion of a sortal concept, and which has so far not been
mentioned, is that of Dummett (1981). Dummett denies that a criterion
of identity must always be regarded as a criterion of identity for a
type of object. There is a basic level, he suggests, at which
what a criterion of identity is a criterion of, is the truth of a
statement in which no objects are referred to. Such a
statement can be expressed using demonstratives and pointing gestures,
for instance, by saying “This is the same cat as that”,
pointing first to a head and then a tail. In such a statement, which
he calls a statement of identification, in Dummett’s view, there
need be no reference to objects made by the use of the demonstratives,
any more than reference is made to any object in a feature-placing
sentence like “It’s hot here”. A statement of
identification is merely, as it were, a feature-placing relational
statement, like “This is darker than that”. A grasp of a
sortal concept F involves both grasp of the truth-conditions
of such statements of identification involving
“F” and also grasp of the truth-conditions of
what Dummett calls “crude predications” involving
“F”, statements of the form “this is
F”, in which the demonstrative again does not serve to
refer to any object. Adjectival terms, which have only a criterion of
application and no criterion of identity, are ones which have a use in
such crude predications, but no use in statements of identification.
Sortal terms, as just noted, have a use in both contexts, and sortal
terms may share their criteria of application but differ in their
criteria of identity since grasp of the truth-conditions of the crude
predication “This is F” does not determine grasp
of the truth-conditions of the statement of identification “This
is the same F as that” (thus I can know when it is
right to say “This is a book” without knowing when it is
right to say “This is the same book as that”).
On Dummett’s account, then, it may be possible to accept that
whenever a criterion of identity for a type of object is to
be given it must be (expressible as) a two-level criterion, which
implicitly defines a functor. Essentially one-level criteria
(one-level criteria not expressible in a two-level form) are
redundant, determined by specifications of necessary and sufficient
conditions for being objects of the sorts in question.
5. Identity over time
As noted in the last section, another source of apparent disunity in
the concept of a criterion of identity is the distinction made between
synchronic criteria of identity and diachronic criteria of identity.
Criteria of identity can be employed synchronically, as in the
examples just given, to determine whether two coexistent objects are
parts of the same object of a sort, or diachronically, to determine
identity over time. But as Lowe notes (2012: 137), it is an error to
suppose that diachronic identity and synchronic identity are different
kinds of identity and so demand different kinds of identity criteria.
What then is a criterion of identity over time?
Identity over time is itself a controversial notion, however, because
time involves change. Heraclitus argued that one could not bathe in
the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. Hume
argued that identity over time was a fiction we substitute for a
collection of related objects. Such views can be seen as based on a
misunderstanding of Leibniz’s Law: if a thing changes something
is true of it at the later time that is not true of it at the earlier,
so it is not the same. The answer is that what is true of it at the
later time is, say, “being muddy at the later time”, which
was always true of it; similarly, what is true of it at the earlier
time, suitably expressed, remains true of it. But the question remains
how to characterise identity through time and across change given that
there is such a thing.
One topic which has always loomed large in this debate has been the
issue (in the terminology of Lewis 1986, Ch. 4) of perdurance
versus endurance. (Others, for which there is no space for
discussion here, include the debate over Ship of Theseus and
reduplication or fission problems and associated issues about
“best candidate” or “no rival candidate”
accounts of identity over time, and the debate over Humean
supervenience – see articles on relative identity, personal
identity, Hawley 2001 and Sider 2001.)
According to one view, material objects persist by having temporal
parts or stages, which exist at different times and are to be
distinguished by the times at which they exist – this is known
as the view that material objects perdure. Other philosophers deny
that this is so; according to them, when a material object exists at
different times, it is wholly present at those times, for it has no
temporal parts, but only spatial parts, which likewise are wholly
present at the different times they exist. This is known as the view
that material objects endure.
Perdurance theorists, as Quine puts it, reject the point of view
inherent in the tenses of our natural language. From that point of
view persisting things endure and change through time, but do not
extend through time, but only through space. Thus persisting
things are to be sharply distinguished from events or processes, which
precisely do extend through time. One way of describing the position
of the perdurance theorist, then, is to say that he denies the
existence of a distinct ontological category of persisting
things, or substances. Thus, Quine writes, “physical
objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time, are not to
be distinguished from events, or, in the concrete sense of the term,
processes. Each comprises simply the content, however heterogeneous,
of some portion of space-time, however disconnected and
gerrymandered” (1960:171).
In recent controversy two arguments have been at the centre of the
endurance/perdurance debate, one employed by perdurance theorists and
the other by endurance theorists (for other arguments and issues see
the separate article on temporal parts, Hawley 2001 and Sider
2001).
An argument for perdurance which has been hotly debated is due to
David Lewis (1986). If perdurance is rejected, the ascription of dated
or tensed properties to objects must be regarded as assertions of
irreducible relations between objects and times. If Tabby is
fat on Monday, that is a relation between Tabby and Monday, and if
perdurance is rejected it is an irreducible relation between Tabby and
Monday. According to perdurance theory, however, while it is still, of
course, a relation between Tabby and Monday it is not irreducible; it
holds between Tabby and Monday because the temporal part of Tabby on
Monday, Tabby-on-Monday, is intrinsically fat. If perdurance is
rejected, however, no such intrinsic possessor of the property of
fatness can be recognised: Tabby’s fatness on Monday must be
regarded as an irreducible state of affairs.
According to Lewis, this consequence of the rejection of the
perdurance theory is incredible. Whether he is right about this is the
subject of intense debate (Haslanger 2003).
Even if Lewis is right, however, the perdurance theory may still be
found wanting, since it does not secure the most commonsensical
position: that fatness is a property of a cat (Haslanger
2003). According to perdurance theory, rather, it is a property of a
(temporal) cat part. Those known as stage theorists (Hawley 2001,
Sider 2001), accepting the ontology of perdurance theory, but
modifying its semantics, offer a way to secure this desirable result.
Every temporal part of a cat is a cat, they say, so
Tabby-on-Monday (which is what we refer to by “Tabby”, on
Monday) is a cat and is fat, just as we would like. Stage theorists
have to pay a price for this advantage over perdurance theory,
however. For they must accept either that our reports of the
cross-temporal number of cats are not always reports of the counting
of cats (as when I say, truly, that I have only ever owned three cats)
or that two cat-stages (cats) may be counted as one and the
same cat, so that counting cats is not always counting in accordance
with absolute identity.
An argument against the perdurance theory that has been the focus of
interest is one presented in various guises by a number of writers,
including Wiggins (1980), Thomson (1983) and van Inwagen (1990).
Applied to persons (it can equally well be applied to other persisting
things), it asserts that persons have different properties, in
particular, different modal properties, from the summations of
person-stages with which the perdurance theory identifies them. Thus,
by Leibniz’s Law, this identification must be mistaken. As David
Wiggins states the argument: “Anything that is a part of a
Lesniewskian sum [a mereological whole defined by its parts] is
necessarily part of it…But no person or normal material object
is necessarily in the total state that will correspond to the
person- or object-moment postulated by the theory under
discussion” (1980: 168).
To elaborate a little. I might have died when I was five years old.
But that maximal summation of person-stages which, according to
perdurance theory, is me and has a temporal extent of at
least fifty years, could not have had a temporal extent of a mere five
years. So I cannot be such a summation of stages.
This argument illustrates the interdependence of the various topics
discussed under the rubric of identity. Whether it is valid, of
course, depends on the correct analysis of modal predication, and, in
particular, on whether it should be analysed in terms of
“identity across possible worlds” or in terms of Lewisian
counterpart theory. This is the topic of the next section.
6. Identity across possible worlds
In the interpretation of modal discourse recourse is often made to the
idea of “identity across possible worlds”. If modal
discourse is interpreted in this way it becomes natural to regard a
statement ascribing a modal property to an individual as asserting the
identity of that individual across worlds: “Sarah might
have been a millionaire”, on this view, asserts that there is a
possible world in which an individual identical with Sarah is a
millionaire. “Sarah could not have been a
millionaire” asserts that in any world in which an individual
identical with Sarah exists that individual is not a
millionaire.
However, though this is perhaps the most natural way to interpret
de re modal statements (once it has been accepted that the
apparatus of possible worlds is to be used as an interpretative tool),
there are well-known difficulties that make the approach
problematic.
For example, it seems reasonable to suppose that a complex artefact
like a bicycle could have been made of different parts. On the other
hand, it does not seem right that the same bicycle could have been
constructed out of completely different parts.
But now consider a series of possible worlds, beginning with the
actual world, each containing a bicycle just slightly different from
the one in the previous world, the last world in the sequence being
one in which there is a bicycle composed of completely different parts
from the one in the actual world. One cannot say that each bicycle is
identical with the one in the neighbouring world, but not identical
with the corresponding bicycle in distant worlds, since identity is
transitive. Hence it seems one must either adopt an extreme
mereological essentialism, according to which no difference of parts
is possible for an individual, or reject the interpretation of de
re modal discourse as asserting identity across possible
worlds.
This and other problems with cross-world identity suggest that some
other weaker relation, of similarity or what David Lewis calls
counterparthood, should be employed in a possible world analysis of
modal discourse. Since similarity is not transitive this allows us to
say that the bicycle might have had some different parts without
having to say that it might have been wholly different. On the other
hand, such a substitution does not seem unproblematic, for a claim
about what I might have done hardly seems, at first sight, to
be correctly interpretable as a claim about what someone else
(however similar to me) does in another possible world (Kripke 1972
[1980], note 13).
An assessment of the counterpart theoretic analysis is vital not just
to understanding modal discourse, however, but also to getting to the
correct account of identity over time. For, as we saw, the argument
against perdurance theory outlined at the end of the last section
depends on the correct interpretation of modal discourse. In fact, it
is invalid on a counterpart theoretic analysis which allows different
counterpart relations (different similarity relations) to be invoked
according to the sense of the singular term which is the subject of
the de re modal predication (Lewis 1986, Ch. 4), since the
counterpart relation relevant to the assessment of a de re
modal predication with a singular term whose sense determines that it
refers to a person will be different from that relevant to the
assessment of a de re modal predication with a singular term
whose sense determines that it refers to a sum of person-stages.
“I might have existed for only five years” means on the
Lewisian account “There is a person in some possible world
similar to me in those respects important to personhood who exists for
only five years”; “The maximal summation of person stages
of which this current stage is a stage might have existed for only
five years” means “There is a summation of person stages
similar to this one in those respects important to the status of an
entity as a summation of stages which exists for only five
years”. Since the two similarity relations in question are
distinct the first modal statement may be true and the second false
even if I am identical with the sum of stages in question.
Counterpart theory is also significant to the topic of identity over
time in another way, since it provides the analogy to which the stage
theorist (who regards all everyday reference as reference to momentary
stages rather than to perdurers) appeals to explain de re
temporal predication. Thus, according to the stage theorist, just as
“I might have been fat” does not require the existence of
a possible world in which an object identical with me is fat, but only
the existence of a world in which a (modal) counterpart of me is fat,
so “I used to be fat” does not require the existence of a
past time at which someone identical with (the present momentary stage
which is) me was fat, but only the existence of a past time at which a
(temporal) counterpart of me was fat. The problem of identity over
time for things of a kind, for stage theorists, is just the problem of
characterizing the appropriate temporal counterpart relation for
things of that kind.
For a more detailed discussion of the topic, see the entry
transworld identity.
Whether de re modal discourse is to be interpreted in terms
of identity across possible worlds or counterpart theoretically (or in
some other way entirely) is also relevant to our next topic, that of
contingent identity.
7. Contingent identity
Before Kripke’s writings (1972 [1980]), it seemed a platitude
that statements of identity could be contingent – when they
contained two terms differing in sense but identical in reference and
so were not analytic. Kripke challenged this platitude, though, of
course, he did not reject the possibility of contingent statements of
identity. But he argued that when the terms flanking the sign of
identity were what he called rigid designators, an identity statement,
if true at all, had to be necessarily true, but need not be knowable
a priori, as an analytic truth would be. Connectedly, Kripke
argued that identity and distinctness were themselves necessary
relations: if an object is identical with itself it is necessarily so,
and if it is distinct from another it is necessarily so.
Kripke’s arguments were very persuasive, but there are examples
that suggest that his conclusion is too sweeping – that even
identity statements containing rigid designators can be, in a sense,
contingent. The debate over contingent identity is concerned with the
assessment and proper analysis of these examples.
One of the earliest examples is provided by Gibbard (1975). Consider a
statue, Goliath, and the clay, Lumpl, from which it is composed.
Imagine that Lumpl and Goliath coincide in their spatiotemporal
extent. It is tempting to conclude that they are identical. But they
might not have been. Goliath might have been rolled into a ball and
destroyed; Lumpl would have continued to exist. The two would have
been distinct. Thus it seems that the identity of Lumpl and Goliath,
if admitted, must be acknowledged as merely contingent.
One reaction to this argument available to the convinced Kripkean is
simply to deny that Lumpl and Goliath are identical. But to accept
this is to accept that purely material entities, like statues and
lumps of clay, of admittedly identical material constitution at all
times, may nonetheless be distinct, though distinguished only by
modal, dispositional or counterfactual properties. To many, however,
this seems highly implausible, which provides the strength of the
argument for contingent identity. Another way of thinking of this
matter is in terms of the failure of the supervenience of the
macroscopic on the microscopic. If Lumpl is distinct from Goliath then
a far distant duplicate of Lumpl, Lumpl*, coincident with a statue
Goliath*, though numerically distinct from Goliath will be
microscopically indistinguishable from Goliath in
all general respects, relational as well as non-relational,
past and future as well as present, even modal and dispositional as
well as categorical, but will be macroscopically
distinguishable in general respects, since it will not be a statue,
and will have modal properties, such as the capacity to survive
radical deformation in shape, which no statue possesses.
David Lewis (in “Counterparts of Persons and their
Bodies”, 1971) suggests that the identity of a person with his
body (assuming the person and the body, like Goliath and Lumpl, are at
all times coincident) is contingent, since bodily interchange is a
possibility. He appeals to counterpart theory, modified to allow a
variety of counterpart relations, to explain this. Contingent identity
then makes sense, since “I and my body might not have been
identical” now translates into counterpart theory as
“There is a possible world, w, a unique personal
counterpart x in w of me and a unique bodily
counterpart y in w of my body, such that x
and y are not identical”.
What is crucial to making sense of contingent identity is an
acceptance that modal predicates are inconstant in denotation (that
is, stand for different properties when attached to different singular
terms or different quantifying expressions). Counterpart theory
provides one way of explaining this inconstancy, but is not
necessarily the only way (Gibbard 1975, Noonan 1991, 1993). However,
whether the examples of contingent identity in the literature are
persuasive enough to make it reasonable to accept the certainly
initially surprising idea that modal predications are inconstant in
denotation is still a matter of considerable controversy.
Finally, in this section, it is worth noting explicitly the
interdependence of the topics under discussion: only if the
possibility of contingent identity is secured, by counterpart theory
or some other account of de re modality which does not
straightforwardly analyse de re modal predication in terms of
identity across possible worlds, can perdurance theory (or stage
theory) as an account of identity across time be sustained against the
modal arguments of Wiggins, Thomson and van Inwagen.
8. Composition as Identity
A thesis that has a long pedigree but has only recently been gathering
attention in the contemporary literature is the “Composition as
Identity” thesis. The thesis comes in a weak and a strong form.
In its weak form the thesis is that the mereological composition
relation is analogous in a number of important ways to the identity
relation and so deserves to be called a kind of identity. In
its strong form the thesis is that the composition relation is
strictly identical with the identity relation, viz. that the parts of
a whole are literally (collectively) identical with the whole itself.
The strong thesis was considered by Plato in Parmenides and
versions of the thesis have been discussed by many historical figures
since (Harte 2002, Normore and Brown 2014). The progenitor of the
modern version of the thesis is Baxter (1988a, 1988b, 2001) but it is
most often discussed under the formulation of it given by Lewis
(1991), who first considers the strong thesis before rejecting it in
favour of the weak thesis.
Both the strong and the weak versions of the thesis are motivated by
the fact that there is an especially intimate relation between a whole
and its parts (a whole is “nothing over and above” its
parts), buttressed by claims that identity and composition are alike
in various ways. Lewis (1991: 85) makes five likeness claims:
Ontological Innocence. If one believes that some object
x exists, one does not gain a commitment to a further object
by believing that something identical with x exists.
Likewise, if one believes that some objects x1,
x2, …, xn
exist, one does not gain a commitment to a further object by claiming
that something composed of x1,
x2, …, xn
exists.
Automatic Existence. If some object x exists,
then it automatically follows that something identical with x
exists. Likewise, if some objects x1,
x2, …, xn
exist, then it automatically follows that something composed of
x1, x2, …,
xn exists.
Unique Composition. If something y is identical
with x, then anything identical with x is identical
with y, and anything identical with y is identical
with x. Likewise, if some things y1,
y2, …, yn
compose x, then any things that compose x are
identical with y1, y2,
…, yn, and anything identical with
x is composed of y1,
y2, …,
yn.
Exhaustive Description. If y is identical with
x, then an exhaustive description of y is an
exhaustive description of x, and vice versa. Likewise, if
y1, y2, …,
yn compose x, then an exhaustive
description of y1, y2,
…, yn is an exhaustive description
of x, and vice versa.
Same Location. If y is identical with
x, then necessarily, x and y fill the same
region of spacetime. Likewise, if y1,
y2, …, yn
compose x, then necessarily, y1,
y2, …, yn and
x fill the same region of spacetime.
Clearly not all will agree with each of Lewis’s likeness claims.
Anyone who denies unrestricted mereological composition, for example,
will deny 2. And the defender of strong pluralism in the material
constitution debate (i.e. one who defends the view that there can be
all-time coincident entities) will deny 3. And some endurantists who
think that ordinary material objects can have distinct parts at
distinct times will deny 5. But there is a more general problem with
1, as van Inwagen has made clear (1994: 213). Consider a world w1 that
contains just two simples s1 and s2. Now consider the difference
between someone p1 who believes that s1 and s2 compose something and
someone p2 who does not. Ask: how many objects do p1 and p2 believe
there to be in w1? The answer, it seems, is that p1 believes that
there are three things and p2 only two. So how can a commitment to the
existence of fusions be ontologically innocent? One recent suggestion
is that although a commitment to the existence of fusions is not
ontologically innocent, it almost is: to commit oneself to
fusions is to commit oneself to further entities, but because they are
not fundamental entities they are not ones that matter for the purpose
of theory choice (Cameron 2014, Schaffer 2008, Williams 2010, and see
also Hawley 2014).
If one believes Lewis’s likeness claims one will be tempted by
at least the weak Composition as Identity thesis. If composition is a
type of identity this gives some kind of explanation of why the
parallels between the two hold. But the strong thesis, that the
composition relation is the identity relation, gives a fuller
explanation. So why not hold the strong thesis? Because, many think,
there are additional challenges that face anyone who wishes to defend
the strong thesis.
The classical identity relation is one that can only have single
objects as relata (as in: “Billie Holiday = Eleanora
Fagan”). If we adopt a language that allows the formation of
plural terms we can unproblematically define a plural identity
relation that holds between pluralities of objects too. Plural
identity statements such as “the hunters are identical with the
gatherers” are understood to mean that for all x,
x is one of the hunters iff x is one of the
gatherers. But, according to the strong Composition as Identity
thesis, there can also be true hybrid identity statements that relate
pluralities and single objects. That is, sentences such as “the
bricks = the wall” are taken by the defender of strong
Composition as Identity to be well-formed sentences that express
strict identities.
The first challenge facing the defender of the strong thesis is the
least troublesome. It is the syntactic problem that hybrid identity
statements are ungrammatical in English (Van Inwagen, 1994: 211).
Whilst “Billie Holiday is identical with Eleanora
Fagan” and “the hunters are identical with the
gatherers” are well-formed, it seems that “the bricks are
identical with the wall” is not. However, there is in fact some
doubt about whether hybrid identity statements are ungrammatical in
English, and some have pointed out that this is anyway a mere
grammatical artefact of English that is not present in other languages
(e.g. Norwegian and Hungarian). So it seems that the most this
challenge calls for is a mild form of grammatical revisionism. And we
have, at any rate, formal languages that allow hybrid constructions to
be made in which to express the claims made by the defender of the
strong Composition as Identity thesis. (Sider 2007, Cotnoir 2013) (NB
The claims regarding Norwegian and Hungarian are to be found in these
two papers.)
The second challenge is more troublesome. It is the semantic problem
of providing coherent truth-conditions for hybrid identity statements.
The standard way to provide the truth-conditions for the classical
identity relation is to say that an identity statement of the form
“a=b” is true iff
“a” and “b” have the same
referents. But this account clearly does not work for hybrid identity
statements, for there is no (single) referent for a plural term.
Moreover, the standard way of giving the truth-conditions for plural
identity statements (mentioned above) does not work for hybrid
identity statements either. To say that “x is one of
the ys” is to say that x is (classically)
identical with one of the things in the plurality, i.e., that
x is identical with y1, or identical with
y2… or identical with
yn. But then “the bricks = the
wall” is true only if the wall is (classically) identical with
one of the bricks, i.e. with b1, or with
b2… or with
bn, which it isn’t.
The third challenge is the most troublesome of all. In section 2 it
was noted that Leibniz’s Law (and its contrapositive) appear to
be crucial to our understanding of identity and distinctness. But it
seems that the defender of strong Composition as Identity must deny
this. After all, the bricks are many, but the wall is one. The onus is
thus on the defender of strong Composition as Identity to explain why
we should think the “are” in hybrid identity statements
really expresses the relation of identity.
The second and the third challenges have been thought by many to be
insurmountable (Lewis, for example, rejects strong Composition as
Identity on the basis of them). But, in recent semantic work in this
area, accounts have emerged that promise to answer both challenges.
(Wallace 2011a, 2011b, Cotnoir 2013). Whether they do so, however,
remains to be seen.
9. Vague identity
Like the impossibility of contingent identity, the impossibility of
vague identity appears to be a straightforward consequence of the
classical concept of identity (Evans 1978, see also Salmon 1982). For
if a is only vaguely identical with b, something is
true of it – that it is only vaguely identical with b
– that is not true of b, so, by Leibniz’s Law, it
is not identical with b at all. Of course, there are vague
statements of identity – “Princeton is Princeton
Borough” (Lewis 1988) – but the conclusion appears to
follow that such vagueness is only possible when one or both of the
terms flanking the sign of identity is an imprecise designator.
Relatedly, it appears to follow that identity itself must be a
determinate relation.
But some examples suggest that this conclusion is too sweeping –
that even identity statements containing precise designators may be,
in some sense, indeterminate. Consider Everest and some precisely
defined hunk of rock, ice and snow, Rock, of which it is indeterminate
whether its boundaries coincide with those of Everest. It is tempting
to think that “Everest” and “Rock” are both
precise designators (if “Everest” is not, is anything?
(Tye 2000)) and that “Everest is Rock” is nonetheless in
some sense indeterminate.
Those who take this view have to respond to Evans’s original
argument, about which there has been intense debate (see separate
article on vagueness, Edgington 2000, Lewis 1988, Parsons 2000, van
Inwagen 1990, Williamson 2002 and 2003), but also to more recent
variants. There is no space to go into these matters here, but one
particular variant of the Evans argument worth briefly noting is given
by Hawley (2001). Alpha and Omega are (two?) people, the first of whom
steps into van Inwagen’s (1990) fiendish cabinet which disrupts
whatever features are relevant to personal identity, and the second of
whom then steps out:
(1) It is indeterminate whether Alpha steps out of the cabinet
(2) Alpha is such that it is indeterminate whether she steps out of
the cabinet
(3) It is not indeterminate whether Omega steps out of the cabinet
(4) Omega is not such that it is indeterminate whether she steps out
of the cabinet
(5) Alpha is not identical to Omega.
This argument differs from the standard version of Evans’s
argument by not depending upon identity-involving properties (e.g.
being such that it is indeterminate whether she is Omega) to establish
distinctness, and this removes some sources of controversy. Others, of
course, remain.
The debate over vague identity is too vast to survey here, but to
finish this section we can relate this debate to the previously
discussed debate about identity over time.
For some putative cases of vagueness in synchronic identity it seems
reasonable to accept the conclusion of Evans’s argument and
locate the indeterminacy in language (see the “Reply” by
Shoemaker in Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984 for the following example).
A structure consists of two halls, Alpha Hall and Beta Hall, linked by
a flimsy walkway, Smith is located in Alpha Hall, Jones in Beta Hall.
The nature of the structure is such that the identity statement
“The building in which Smith is located is the building in which
Jones is located” is neither true nor false because it is
indeterminate whether Alpha Hall and Beta Hall count as two distinct
buildings or merely as two parts of one and the same building. Here it
is absolutely clear what is going on. The term “building”
is vague in a way that makes it indeterminate whether it applies to
the whole structure or just to the two halls. Consequently, it is
indeterminate what “the building in which Smith is
located” and “the building in which Jones is
located” denote.
Perdurance theorists, who assimilate identity over time to identity
over space, can accommodate vagueness in identity over time in the
same way. In Hawley’s example they can say that there are
several entities present: one that exists before and after the
identity-obscuring occurrences in the cabinet, one that exists only
before, and one that exists only after. It is indeterminate which of
these is a person and so it is indeterminate what the singular terms
“Alpha” and “Omega” refer to.
This involves taking on an ontology that is larger than we ordinarily
recognise, but that is not uncongenial to the perdurance theorist, who
is happy to regard any, however spatiotemporally disconnected, region
as containing a physical object (Quine 1960:171).
But what of endurance theorists?
One option for them is to adopt the same response and to accept a
multiplicity of entities partially coinciding in space and time where
to common sense there seems to be only one. But this is to give up on
one of the major advantages claimed by the endurance theorist, his
consonance with common sense.
The endurance theorist has several other options. He may simply deny
the existence of the relevant entities and restrict his ontology to
entities which are not complex; he may insist that any change destroys
identity so that in a strict and philosophical sense Alpha is distinct
from Omega; or he may reject the case as one of vagueness, insisting
that, though we do not know the answer, either Alpha is Omega or she
is not.
However, the most tempting option for the endurance theorist, which
keeps closest to common sense, is to accept that the case is one of
vagueness, deny the multiplicity of entities embraced by the
perdurance theorist and reject Evans’s argument against vague
identity.
That this is so highlights the fact that there is no easy solution to
the problem consonant in every respect with common sense. Locating the
vagueness in language requires us to acknowledge a multiplicity of
entities of which we would apparently otherwise have to take no
notice. Whilst locating it in the world requires an explanation of
how, contrary to Evans’s argument, the impossibility of vague
identity is not a straightforward consequence of the classical
conception of identity, or else the abandonment of that
conception.
10. Are there philosophical problems about identity?
Finally in this entry we return briefly to the idea mentioned in the
introduction that although the debates about identity make sense they
cannot genuinely be debates about identity, since there are no
philosophical problems about identity. This view has recently been
receiving increasing attention. Lewis is the most cited defender
of this view. In the context of discussing the putative
“problem” of trans-world identity he says:
[W]e should not suppose that we have here any problem about
identity. We never have. Identity is utterly simple and
unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; nothing is ever
identical to anything except itself. There is never any problem about
what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail to
be. (Lewis 1986: 192–93)
Lewis’s argument here might be expanded as
follows: Consider any putative problem about the conditions under
which a thing x is identical with a thing y. There
are only two cases: either (i) x is identical with
y, or (ii) x is not identical with y.
Consider case (i). In this case the putative problem is about the
conditions under which x is identical with itself. But there
cannot be any such problem, because it is a conceptual truth that
everything is identical with itself, and so x is identical
with itself under all conditions. To ask for the conditions under
which something is identical with itself is like asking ‘Under
what conditions is one thing one thing, and not two things?’
There can be no informative answer because necessarily, if something
is one thing then it is one thing, and not two things, and nothing
more can be said. Now consider case (ii). The putative problem is now
about the conditions under which a thing x is identical with
a different thing y. But there cannot be any such problem,
because it is a conceptual truth that one thing and a different thing
are not identical, and so there are no conditions under which
x and y are identical. To ask for the conditions
under which one thing and a different thing are identical is like
asking ‘Under what conditions are two things one thing, and not
two things?’ There can be no informative answer because
necessarily, if two things are two things, then they are two things,
and not one thing, and nothing more can be said. And so, whether case
(i) or case (ii) holds, there can be no problem about the conditions
under which a thing x is identical with a thing
y.
The argument seems persuasive, but anyone who accepts it is committed
to it being possible to state problems that seem to be about
identity (such as the “problem” of trans-world identity)
in terms that make it clear that such problems are not in fact about
identity. Furthermore, it seems that we do very often use the
concept of identity, and an explanation of how and why we use it
so often seems to be required if the argument above is sound.
Most seem to have accepted Lewis’s view (see, e.g., Akiba
2000, Hawthorne 2003, Noonan 2007, Noonan and Curtis 2018), but
there are some who dissent (Gallois 2005, Shumener 2020, Azzano
and Carrara 2021). The question of how and why we use the concept of
identity was a central concern of Wittgenstein (see Fogelin 1983 for
an overview), and has recently received attention from others (Burgess
2018).
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identity: of indiscernibles |
identity: relative |
identity: transworld |
many, problem of |
personal identity |
temporal parts |
vagueness
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Identity
Self-Image, Self-Concept
Reviewed by Psychology Today Staff
Identity encompasses the memories, experiences, relationships, and values that create one’s sense of self. This amalgamation creates a steady sense of who one is over time, even as new facets are developed and incorporated into one's identity.
Contents
What Is Identity?
How to Be Authentic
Theories of Identity
What Is Identity?
Everyone struggles with existential questions such as, “Who am I?” and “Who do I want my future self to be?” One reason why may be that the answer is so complex.
Identity includes the many relationships people cultivate, such as their identity as a child, friend, partner, and parent. It involves external characteristics over which a person has little or no control, such as height, race, or socioeconomic class. Identity also encompasses political opinions, moral attitudes, and religious beliefs, all of which guide the choices one makes on a daily basis.
People who are overly concerned with the impression they make, or who feel a core aspect of themselves, such as gender or sexuality, is not being expressed, can struggle acutely with their identity. Reflecting on the discrepancy between who one is and who one wants to be can be a powerful catalyst for change.
What defines identity?
Created with Sketch.
Identity encompasses the values people hold, which dictate the choices they make. An identity contains multiple roles—such as a mother, teacher, and U.S. citizen—and each role holds meaning and expectations that are internalized into one’s identity. Identity continues to evolve over the course of an individual’s life.
How is identity formed?
Created with Sketch.
Identity formation involves three key tasks: Discovering and developing one’s potential, choosing one’s purpose in life, and finding opportunities to exercise that potential and purpose. Identity is also influenced by parents and peers during childhood and experimentation in adolescence.
Why don’t I understand myself?
Created with Sketch.
Every individual has a goal of nurturing values and making choices that are consistent with their true self. Some internalize the values of their families or culture, even though they don’t align with their authentic self. This conflict can drive dissatisfaction and uncertainty. Reflecting on one’s values can spark change and a more fulfilling life.
What is an identity crisis?
Created with Sketch.
The idea of an identity crisis emerged from psychologist Erik Erikson, who delineated eight stages of crises and development, a concept later expanded upon by others. Although not a clinical term, an identity crisis refers to facing a challenge to one’s sense of self, which may center around politics, religion, career choices, or gender roles.
Why is my teen changing so much?
Created with Sketch.
Adolescence is a time in which children develop an authentic sense of self, distinct from their parents, in order to become an independent adult. Experimentation is an important part of the process: As teens try on different identities—in terms of friends, hobbies, appearance, gender, and sexuality—they come to understand who they are and who they want to be.
How does identity influence relationships?
Created with Sketch.
Features of identity can highlight similarities or differences between people—through race, gender, or profession—which can function to either unite or divide. People who view themselves as members of a larger overarching group tend to have stronger kinship with other people, animals, and nature.
article continues after advertisement
How to Be Authentic
A hunger for authenticity guides us in every age and aspect of life. It drives our explorations of work, relationships, play, and prayer. Teens and twentysomethings try out friends, fashions, hobbies, jobs, lovers, locations, and living arrangements to see what fits and what's "just not me." Midlifers deepen commitments to career, community, faith, and family that match their self-images, or feel trapped in existences that seem not their own. Elders regard life choices with regret or satisfaction based largely on whether they were "true" to themselves.
Authenticity is also a cornerstone of mental health. It’s correlated with many aspects of psychological well-being, including vitality, self-esteem, and coping skills. Acting in accordance with one's core self—a trait called self-determination—is ranked by some experts as one of three basic psychological needs, along with competence and a sense of relatedness.
How do I live authentically?
Created with Sketch.
Everyone subconsciously internalizes conventions and expectations that dictate how they believe they should think or behave. The decision to examine or challenge those assumptions, even though it’s difficult, is the first step to living more authentically. This set of 20 steps can guide you through that process.
How do I balance being authentic and fitting in?
Created with Sketch.
There can be tension between being wholly yourself and operating successfully in your relationships and career. No one should be completely deceitful or completely forthright; a guiding principle to achieve a balance is that as long as you’re not forced to act in opposition to your values or personality, a little self-monitoring can be warranted.
How can I stay true to myself in a relationship?
Created with Sketch.
Relationships can come under threat when there’s a disconnect between expressing yourself freely and taking your partner’s feelings into account. The Authenticity in Relationships scale —which measures this construct through statements such as “I am fully aware of when to insist on myself and when to compromise”—can initiate discussion and help couples cultivate a healthy balance.
How has identity changed due to social media?
Created with Sketch.
As so much of the world has shifted online, discrepancies have emerged between one’s virtual self and real self. People may cultivate their online avatar more and more carefully over time, and the virtual self can influence the perception of the real self. Therefore, it can be valuable to reflect on whether the virtual self is really authentic.
Theories of Identity
One of the most enduring theories of development was proposed by psychologist Erik Erikson. Erikson divided the lifecycle into eight stages that each contained a conflict, with the resolution of those conflicts leading to the development of personality. The conflict that occurs during adolescence, Erikson believed, is “identity versus role confusion.”
Adolescents grapple with so many different aspects of identity, from choosing a career path to cultivating moral and political beliefs to becoming a friend or partner. Role confusion pertains to the inability to commit to one path. Adolescents then go through a period of experimentation before committing, reconciling the pieces of their identity, and emerging into adulthood.
Identity formation is most acute during adolescence, but the process doesn’t stop after the teen years. Taking on a new role, such as becoming a parent, can make self-definition a lifelong process.
As a person grows older, the overall trend is toward identity achievement. But major life upheavals, such as divorce, retirement, or the death of a loved one, often lead people to explore and redefine their identities.
How did Freud understand identity?
Created with Sketch.
According to Freud’s psychoanalytic framework, the mind was composed of the id, driven by instinct and desire, the superego, driven by morality and values, and the ego which moderates the two and creates one’s identity. Many features contribute to ego functioning, including insight, agency, empathy, and purpose.
How did Erik Erikson understand identity?
Created with Sketch.
Erik Erikson’s proposed a theory of development based on different stages of life. He also coined the term “ego identity,” which he conceived as an enduring and continuous sense of who a person is. The ego identity helps to merge all the different versions of oneself (the parent self, the career self, the sexual self) into one cohesive whole, so that if disaster strikes, there's a stable sense of self.
What is social identity theory?
Created with Sketch.
Social psychologist Henri Tajfel conducted pioneering research on prejudice, revealing that people favor those in their own groups, even when those groups are designated randomly, such as by people’s preferences for artwork. This research was the basis for Social Identity Theory—that self-esteem is in part derived from group membership, which provides pride and social identity.
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